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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents research that employs agent-based modelling to provide a framework
to support simulation as a complement to traditional economic models for policy evaluation. It
consists of three studies. The first study employs cluster analysis to capture the different types of
banks and the associated business models that define their decision-making. The results from
study one will help us get an understanding of how different banks behave and provide an insight
into their lending practices. Hence, it would be very helpful in evaluating and analyzing the
impact of future policies. Study two develops a fine-grained interbank lending model based on
the regulatory balance sheet data. The objective of our model is to implement the mechanisms
that result in changes to the balance sheets of the banks in the system. The model will help
demonstrate how each individual bank will face unique decisions, which could lead to emergent
behavior. Based on FDIC data, the bank class is instantiated as individual banks using real
balance sheet data from a selected point in time. The model will be evaluated by validating
against past policies and checking whether the agents in the model behave similar to banks in
reality. The final study of the dissertation presents the impact of future policies on liquidity that
have been released by the Federal Reserve, and will demonstrate how they influence the
simulated banks’ and their business models. Study III leverages the output from both studies I
and II, to conduct experiments on policies proposed by the Fed regarding Liquidity. This
research will not only provide an alternative framework to test and evaluate the monetary
policies prescribed by the Federal Reserve, but also provide a platform that can help design and
evaluate future ones.
vi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and reverberating effects during the Great Recession had
profound impacts on financial markets and the monetary system. In response to the crisis, central
banks around the world took unprecedented action in order to ease financial conditions. In the
US, the Federal Reserve (Fed) responded by providing credit to financial institutions, lowering
interest rates (through the target federal funds rate), providing additional forward guidance, and
eventually engaging in a series of large-scale asset purchase programs known as quantitative
easing (QE). As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet has undergone a more than five-fold increase
since the start of the crisis, with total assets growing from roughly $850 billion to more than $4.5
trillion and banking reserves expanding from $20 billion to more than $2 trillion. At this point,
the Federal Reserve has embarked on a program of monetary policy normalization which implies
an unwinding of these extraordinary positions.
The impact of this new phase of monetary policy normalization is a matter of wideranging debate. While the Fed has acted cautiously and been quite transparent about its gradual
approach toward reducing the balance sheet, significant uncertainty around the effects of the
unwind remains. The exact impact on financial markets and institutions depends on the actions
(and reactions) of all financial system participants. Policy normalization will unfold from a
unique starting point, at a time when the US Treasury is embarking on a significant fiscal
stimulus program and within a new untested regulatory environment. There is little or no
historical precedent to inform policy makers about the range (and likelihood) of possible
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scenarios. So, debate is understandable, but what tools are available to help us evaluate policy
alternatives?
Clearly, the US Federal Reserve and counterparts around the world will continue to use
existing models to better understand unfolding challenges and evaluate proposed policy
alternatives. Our research looks at adding agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMs) as a
possible alternative to traditional economic models. This dissertation research focuses on how
agent-based modelling (ABM) can be used to study the systemic risk in financial markets like
the interbank loan market. The Federal Reserve is set to pass multiple policies towards balance
sheet normalization, which will have immense effect on the banking sector, but there is no tool
available to proactively evaluate the proposed policy alternatives. This dissertation looks at
adding Agent-based modelling and simulation to the toolkit. The overall goal is to develop
agent-based models that support simulation as a complement to traditional economic models for
policy evaluation.

1.1. Why Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation?
Why is agent-based modeling a reasonable methodology for investigating economic phenomena?
In our view, agent-based approaches are particularly well-suited for modeling financial markets,
which are typically complex ecosystems of heterogeneous agents. Economic modeling often
proceeds from theory, through mathematical model formulation, toward a better understanding
of the economic system being studied. This top-down approach employs abstractions that focus
on equilibrium states which derive from common aggregate behaviors of representative agent
classes. Agent-based modeling uses simulation, based on the interactions of many individually
instantiated autonomous heterogeneous agents, to generate the emergent behaviors associated
with complex systems (and hopefully inform theory). This more bottom-up approach starts with
2

a characterization of the ecosystem and proceeds through the implementation of heterogeneous
agent behaviors (and interactions) towards understanding and theory refinement (Farmer and
Foley 2009). The record of more traditional economic models in understanding crisis dynamics
is somewhat mixed. Agent-based models may provide some help in understanding economic
systems, especially under conditions of stress. For a persuasive and much more expansive case
for agent-based modeling, see Richard Bookstaber’s recent book End of Theory (Bookstaber
2017). Some of the factors that favor agent-based modeling are outlined below.
• Heterogeneous agents: As noted above, agent-based approaches rely on the interactions of
heterogeneous agents to generate emergent behaviors of interest. The Federal funds market
model described here uses a small (at least to start) set of agent classes to represent the principal
decision-making agencies using behaviors anchored in the finance literature. This is a
hierarchical model, with coarse-grained agents representing government agencies and other
representative agent classes. More fine-grained collections of heterogeneous agents are used to
expand certain sectors, such as the banking sector, capturing more nuanced behaviors through
interaction and simulation.
• Emergent phenomena: Complex system-wide dynamics arise from the interactions between
individual agents making simple decisions such as firms trading in a market. Agent-based
modeling is based on the actions and interactions between individual autonomous synthetic
agents implemented with important behaviors encoded as decision-making algorithms. Basically,
the ABM approach is all about emergent system dynamics (simple rules, complex behaviors).
• Non-ergodic processes: Individual actions and interactions that take into account prior context
make each simulation pathway potentially unique. As Bookstaber suggests: Does history (and
context) matter? For roulette, no. For human behavior, typically an emphatic yes.
3

• Radical uncertainty: Emergent phenomena and non-ergodic processes lead to unanticipated
uncertainty (“black swans”) or “the things we do not know we do not know” (as noted by D.
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense). These unknowns are exactly the type of phenomena that
characterize crisis dynamics.
• Computational irreducibility: Complex systems, based on context-driven interactions, can
often be understood only by tracing out the entire path over time (using simulation rather than
mathematical shortcuts). This makes agent-based modeling and simulation a natural fit for
studying systems like financial markets.
1.2

Research Approach

In this dissertation I present new insights and methods showcasing how a framework using agent
-based models can be developed to study and evaluate monetary policies for Financial markets.
The dissertation consists of three studies.
In study one, I examine the changing heterogeneity of commercial bank lending and the
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. Prior to 2008, the conduct of monetary policy by
the Federal Reserve targeted the level of the Fed Funds rate (the interest rate for overnight
lending of bank reserves) through changes in the supply of bank reserves. Under conventional
monetary policy, the banking sector acts as the main transmission mechanism to the real
economy, with changes in short term interest rates affecting activity in the real economy through
changes in bank balance sheets (the deposit and bank lending channels). In contrast to
conventional policy, the transmission of unconventional monetary policy impulses remains ill
understood. In addition to the introduction of new transmission channels (including the
‘signaling’ and ‘portfolio balance’ channels of quantitative easing), the mechanics of the existing
bank lending mechanism appear to have changed. The introduction of IOER (Interest on Excess
4

Reserves) had significant implications for the bank-lending channel (the specifics of which
remain the subject of significant debate). A proper understanding of the bank-lending channel in
the ‘new regime’ is considered highly important for several reasons. Firstly, banks are the
dominant provider of credit to small business who account for a significant portion of US
employment and growth. Banks furthermore operate the domestic payment system and bank
lending is central to the money supply and overall financial conditions.
In study one, we investigate changes in bank lending portfolios with a view of identifying
implications for the operation of the bank-lending channel. It is important to note that bank
lending has undergone significant changes over the past 10 years. Overall the banking sector has
seen significant consolidation due to M&A activity (decline in the number of banks, rise of the
G-SIBs) while banking institutions have moved away from pursuing specialization in their
financial services portfolio to embrace a diversified business model. The consolidation in the
banking sector (supported by changes in technology) have led to an increase in bank scale and a
decrease in the heterogeneity of business models.
The corresponding loss of heterogeneity in banking business models has profound
implications for the resilience of the sector and the transmission of monetary policy. Prior
analyses focused on the implications for systemic risk bank capital allocation, bank liquidity and
solvency. We intend to analyze the nature of the rising homogeneity in bank lending portfolios
with a view on assessing its drivers and implications for the functioning of the bank-lending
channel of monetary policy.
In the second study I design an Agent-Based model of the Interbank Lending market.
Currently, we are using FDIC regulatory data that covers all commercial banks, but can expand
the coverage to include savings and loans, credit unions and other institutions. Based on the

5

FDIC data, the bank class is instantiated as individual banks using real balance sheet data from a
selected point in time.
One of the parameters is the number of agent banks, which are instantiated in descending
order based on total assets. For example, the simulations can be run with the 100 largest banks as
agents. During simulations, the banking agents in the BNK model individually respond to
Federal Reserve actions.
The financial crisis (2007-2009) certainly affected the Federal Reserve and interbank
lending market. In fact, overnight lending froze as uncertainty rippled throughout the banking
network and wider financial system. One important way to test agent-based models is to verify
that key behavioral responses emerge given the appropriate inputs. The financial crisis provides a
compelling natural experiment. As the Federal Reserve pursued quantitative easing, banking
reserves grew until the system was awash in money. At this point, borrowing made little sense as
way for a bank to meet reserve requirements, so overnight lending ceased. Does the simulation
model exhibit the same emergent behaviors? The minimal BNK model noted above is used to
test this proposition, with 100 agents representing the largest banks. The simulation was run for
50 ticks, corresponding to business or trading days. Note that loan activity drops as the Federal
Reserve pursues an easy money policy, adding excess reserves to the banking sector. All lending
ceases a few ticks past 30 in the simulation.
Does loan activity start again once the Federal Reserve tightens? Lending should resume
once bank re- serves are lowered enough that liquidity constraints become binding again. This is
exactly what happens in the simulation [Insert Figure 4 Here]. The Federal Reserve agent begins
reducing its balance sheet, thereby reducing the excess reserves. As some banks bump up against
regulatory liquidity constraints, overnight borrowing from other banks with excess reserves starts
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again. These two simple experiments build confidence in the model, demonstrating fundamental
behaviors in response to major events.
In the third study I use the Agent-Based Model developed in study two to assess the
impact of monetary policy normalization. As the Fed unwinds the assets on its balance sheet
through maturities of US Treasury debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, other investors
will have to step in and finance the debt roll over. When private sector agents (banks and nonbank entities) finance assets rolling off the Fed’s balance sheet, bank reserves are reduced. The
capacity of the banking sector to adjust to rapidly decreasing reserves is uncertain, however.
Following the financial crisis, significant new legislation was enacted (2010 Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act) aimed at curbing risk taking and promoting resilience in the
financial system. A key goal has been to make banks more resistant to liquidity risk through the
introduction of new liquidity-based constraints such as the LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and
NSFR (Net Stable Funds Ratio). The new liquidity regulation led to a significant increase in the
demand for bank reserves. Any reduction of reserves beyond the level dictated by the banking
sector’s liquidity driven demand could prove hugely disruptive to the financial system (forcing
the Fed to halt its balance sheet unwind). We intend to analyze the effect of the Fed’s balance
sheet unwind within the broader context of these dynamics, including the effects of the forces
presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Applied research approach in the dissertation
1.3

Research Gaps and Questions

Looking at the past literature, we observe that even though there has been a lot of focus on
systemic risk in Financial networks, there has been no study, to the best of our knowledge, that
has looked at modeling a framework which analyzes and proactively evaluates the impact of
monetary policies. The framework we have developed, would also help evaluate the impact of
future monetary policies, thereby enabling the Federal Reserve to proactively avoid regulations
that can lead to systemic risk. The overarching research question that the dissertation is aiming to
answer is how can agent-based models be used to design and evaluate monetary policies? To
address the overarching goal, study one aims to explore what are the characteristics of lending
practices by bank? In addition, how have these characteristics evolved over the last 40 years?
Study two, in turn, is directed towards answering how can an agent-based model be developed
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for the interbank loan markets for use in simulation studies? Finally, we look to answer how we
can evaluate policy alternatives using agent-based modeling and simulation?
1.4

Data Description

We use historical call report with the balance sheet data of all regulated banks in the USA,
collected by Schnabel (Drechler et al 2017). The data consists of the various characteristics of
each individual bank’s balance sheet that have been reported for each quarter since 1976 until
end of the year 2013. The data consists of 168 variables for each such quarterly balance sheet for
every bank in the system.
We also have collected call report data from the FFIEC database. Thus, providing us with
the reported balance sheet data for each quarter in the past for every registered financial
institute/organization in the country. The data consists of all kinds of financial institutes and has
253 variables.
1.5

Research Design

1.5.1 Agent-Based Modelling Approach
Why is agent-based modeling a reasonable methodology for investigating economic phenomena?
In our view, agent-based approaches are particularly well suited for modeling financial markets,
which are typically complex ecosystems of heterogeneous agents. Economic modeling often
proceeds from theory, through mathematical model formulation, toward a better understanding
of the economic system being studied. This top-down approach employs abstractions that focus
on equilibrium states, which derive from common aggregate behaviors of representative agent
classes. Agent-based modeling uses simulation, based on the interactions of many individually
instantiated autonomous heterogeneous agents, to generate the emergent behaviors associated
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with complex systems (and hopefully inform theory). This more bottom-up approach starts with
a characterization of the ecosystem and proceeds through the implementation of heterogeneous
agent behaviors (and interactions) towards understanding and theory refinement (Farmer and
Foley 2009). The record of more traditional economic models in understanding crisis dynamics
is somewhat mixed. Agent-based models may provide some help in understanding economic
systems, especially under conditions of stress.
One objective of our model is to implement the mechanisms that result in changes to the
balance sheets of the market participants. To that end, the model includes simplified balance
sheets and behaviors for each of the aforementioned agents and captures the resulting aggregate
flow of funds. The coarse-grained model (FED) is combined with a fine-grained banking model
(BNK) to create a high-fidelity hierarchical model of the Fed funds market.
Currently, we are using FDIC regulatory data that covers all commercial banks, but can
expand the coverage to include savings and loans, credit unions and other institutions. Based on
the FDIC data, the bank class is instantiated as individual banks using real balance sheet data
from a selected point in time.
One of the parameters is the number of agent banks, which are instantiated in descending
order based on total assets. For example, the simulations can be run with the 100 largest banks as
agents. During simulations, the banking agents in the BNK model individually respond to
Federal Reserve actions. In addition to the actions of individual banks in the BNK model, agents
in the coarse-grained FED model provide aggregate “representative agent” modeled responses.
The BNK model would enable us to get insights into how each bank would react to being
affected by policies, but to interpret these individual reactions would be quite difficult to
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interpret. Hence, the need to group the individual banks according to their business models, and
these groups could help us understand the reaction towards policies much better.
1.5.2 Cluster Analysis
We plan to use an iterative partitioning, nonhierarchical cluster technique to form the bank
clusters. The K- means procedure iteratively assigns banks to clusters that minimize the sum of
squared distances of the bank attributes from their assigned cluster means (Stowe et al 2018). We
will make use of R and Weka to run the cluster analysis and visualize the attained clusters. To
arrive at the optimal number of clusters, we will make use of internal measures like sum of
squared errors and R-square. These internal consistency measures have been used extensively in
the past literature as a viable means to choose the optimal number of clusters. We will also
demonstrate the relative sum of squared errors and R-squares associated with each algorithm
running with a different value of ‘k’. We will also employ Bayesian Information criterion to
ensure that the value of k that we arrive at is the correct one.
The sum of squared errors is the square of the difference between each observation and
its allocated cluster center. For the optimal number of clusters, the value of SSE should be small,
along with a small value for k. R-square, on the other hand, represents the amount of variation in
data that the clustering model is able to capture. For the ideal scenario, we would like to get a
high value of R-square for a minimalistic value of ‘k.’ We can thus, use these two measures to
obtain the optimal value of ‘k’. We will plot the different values of SSE and R-squared
associated with different values of ‘k’ respectively, and from the elbow of the said plot, we will
be able to recover the optimal number of clusters to perform our analysis. For calculating the
BIC, we construct a likelihood for the Gaussian mixture model and thus determine information
criterion values.
11

1.6

Conclusion

It is important to note that the trajectory and outcome of the monetary policy unwind depend on
the actions of market participants. As the Fed raises rates and unwinds its balance sheet,
investors will likely re-balance portfolios while banks strategically respond to the liquidity risk
implications of reserve draining.
We believe that agent-based simulations can provide valuable insight into the mechanics
and outcome of the unwind. Simulations allow the analysis of likely outcomes for a wide range
of scenarios, using simple behavioral assumptions across the ecology of market participants.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter discusses the literature review which presents past research and concepts related to
this dissertation. First, I discuss past research related to Financial markets, laying an emphasis on
studies that have used simulation as a methodology to study systemic risk or contagion in said
markets. The, I discuss about studies that have looked at various aspects of these networks and
how studies in the past have captured and analyzed them. I present studies that have investigated
the effect of network structure as well as network dynamics on the stability of the network in the
face of an exogeneous shock. Afterwards, I provide a general overview of studies that have used
agent-based modeling (ABM) in the past and why it may be particularly applicable in the current
context. We do discuss the past studies that have used ABM and go over some of the prevailing
assumptions that have been presented in the studies.
Financial networks have been the subject of multiple research studies in the recent past.
The global crisis of 2008 has put Banking networks into the limelight and many research studies
have been conducted to study them in the past decade (Haldane and May 2011, Cont et al. 2010,
Afonso and Lagos 2015, Nyman et al. 2018, Georg 2011). Though, theoretical researchers have
studied inter-dependencies between financial institutions, not a lot of empirical studies have been
conducted in this area. The absence of empirical evidence poses a significant issue for regulatory
agencies, for developing new policies and there has been a call for such studies (Furfine 2003).
This has led to many researchers to employ simulation as a method to study the problem in this
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domain (Krichene and El-Aroui 2018, Hakrama and Frash ̈eri 2018, Hu et al. 2012, Wells 2004,
Furfine 2003, Blavarg and Nimander 2002, Elsinger et al. 2005).
Contagion in financial networks is one area which has seen increasing use of Simulation
as a methodology. Simulation studies have been conducted to stress test different aspects of the
networks, some of them have focused on the stability of the network in the face of an external
shock (Huang et al. 2016, Nier et al. 2008, Ashcraft and Duffie 2007), Chakraborty et al. 2017);
whereas some studies have focused on the role of the network structure on its stability Cont et al.
(2010), Haldane and May (2011), Boss et al. (2004), Markose et al. (2012). Haldane et al.
Haldane and May (2011) in their Nature article, discuss the systemic risk in the banking
ecosystem, focusing on the various financial instruments that were used during the financial
crisis to optimize returns while minimizing risks. Drawing analogies between the dynamics of
banking networks and that of contagions, as infectious diseases spread throughout a population,
complexity and stability of these networks have been tested in further studies. Cont (Cont et al.
2010), for example, emphasize how network structure plays a role in protecting against the
spread of crisis behaviors. Boss (Boss et al. 2004), using a similar approach, tested out network
structure and alternative network topologies of the interbank networks.
Simulation studies have also been used extensively to capture and study Systemic risk in
financial networks in the past. Furfine (Furfine 2003) makes use of Simulation in order to
showcase and quantify the risk of contagion present in the US banking system by examining
interbank exposures. The study estimates contagion by examining real data containing the
complete universe of federal funds transactions across banks in the United States. Using such
data allowed simulation exercises to showcase the degree of contagion that might arise from
these exposures. Such studies help make the case of the usefulness of Simulation studies in
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coming up with new policies to tackle highly complex problems. Blavarg et al (Blavarg and
Nimander 2002) showcases how after the Swedish Bank Crisis of Mid 90s, there was a need of a
framework which could help understand the big picture and is not myopic to possible exogenous
circumstances. Hence, Farmer (Farmer and Foley 2009) in their Nature article presented Agent
Based Modeling as one of the approaches that can be used to model crisis behavior better than
the ones being used then.
Agent based modeling (ABM) has been used in multitude of disciplines and domain in
the past. Be it Biology, Sociology, Medicine or Banking; this class of computational methods
have helped in studying and understanding the actions and interactions between agents in the
absence of theoretical models. Macleod et al (MacLeod and Nersessian 2013) demonstrate how
ABM can used to establish a stable structure by building multiple ground up simulations in a nest
like fashion in Biology systems. Financial markets especially have seen a lot of recent studies
which have used an agent-based approach. Hakrama et al (Hakrama and Frash ̈eri 2018) used an
agent-based model to implement a simulation model of an artificial economy. Similarly,
Krichene et al (Krichene and El-Aroui 2018) in their paper build an agent-based artificial market,
designed to simulate characteristics of immature stock markets (high risk and low efficiency) by
reproducing their stylized facts related mainly to information asymmetry and herd behavior.
Elliot et al (Elliott and Kiel 2002) in their PNAS paper also implement an agent-based approach
to model competitive and cooperative behaviors at both the individual and group levels of
analysis. They put forth the argument that agent-based models produce consistent results
regarding the relative fragility of cooperative regimes among agents operating under diverse
rules.
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Christian Upper (Upper 2011) provides a critical assessment of the modeling assumptions
of the various simulation studies that estimate contagion in the interbank loan markets. He argues
that though the models may be able to predict contagion and even identify the most susceptible
banks, none of them are suitable for analysis of any kind of policy. This is due to the lack of
realistic behavioral foundations in the simulation models. Taking a more fine-grained approach
to better capture agent decision making is one of the key motivations for the study reported here.
Agent- based approaches provide a framework for implementing the essential behaviors of
heterogeneous agent classes. Liu et al. (Liu et al. 2017) take a similar approach and present an
agent-based model that endogenously reconstructs interbank networks based on the decision
rules and behaviors of 6,600 simulated banks. The study finds the lending and borrowing
behaviors to be largely sub-optimal and performance driven.
Our research focuses on applying agent-based modeling and simulation to the Federal
funds market. The study will showcase how we can use these simulations as a tool to evaluate
future policies that the Federal reserve can implement during Balance Sheet normalization. Our
objective is to base our model in such a way as to capture the emergent behavior when the
various agents (banks) interact under different policy implications. Our study is made even more
relevant as we are at a historic point in time as the Federal Reserve begins to reverse course.
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CHAPTER 3. CLUSTERING COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING MODELS
The global financial crisis of 2008 marked the start of a period of transformational change in the
US commercial banking sector and the monetary system. The Dodd-Frank act introduced a
massive regulatory overhaul, subjecting banks to significant new constraints on their activities
and risk management (including new regulatory capital and liquidity requirements). Persistently
low interest rates and flat yield curves challenged bank profitability and return-on-equity,
accelerating consolidation in the sector.
In this chapter we analyze historical bank balance sheet data from 1976 to 2013 and
observe how banking business models, especially bank lending models have evolved. For this
exercise, we first investigate the balance sheet data to identify specific attributes which can
capture the lending behavior of banks. Once such attributes have been identified we collect
information from the last call reports of each of the past decades to observe the transformation in
lending behavior over the years. We apply cluster analysis methods like DBSCAN and K-Means
to extract the different clusters, representing lending models, from each of the said time periods.
We then compare and contrast the different clusters and observe how they change over the years
and which models are popular amongst the major banks over the years. We present our findings
in the results section.
3.1

Background

Responding to the economic slowdown, the Federal Reserve took unprecedented action as well,
lowering interest rates to the zero lower bound and furthermore engaging in a series of non-
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conventional monetary policy initiatives, including forward guidance and large-scale asset
purchase programs (known as quantitative easing or QE).
Prior to 2008, the conduct of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve targeted the level of the
Fed Funds rate (the interest rate for overnight lending of bank reserves) through changes in the
supply of bank reserves. Under conventional monetary policy, the banking sector acts as the
main transmission mechanism to the real economy, with changes in short term interest rates
affecting activity in the real economy through changes in bank balance sheets (the deposit and
bank lending channels). Given the lengthy history and an extensive body of supporting research,
the transition mechanisms of conventional monetary policy are well understood.
In contrast to conventional policy, the transmission of unconventional monetary policy
impulses remains ill understood. In addition to the introduction of new transmission channels
(including the ‘signaling’ and ‘portfolio balance’ channels of quantitative easing), the mechanics
of the existing bank lending mechanism appear to have changed. The operation of an abundant
reserve regime (bank reserves expanded from around $20 billion to over $2.5 trillion) and the
introduction of IOER (Interest on Excess Reserves, an administered interest rate on bank
reserves at the Fed) had significant implications for the bank lending channel (the specifics of
which remain the subject of significant debate). One mystery of the slow recovery following
2008 is why bank lending failed to respond to expansionary monetary policy. While some
analysts point to a lack of loan demand, others look to the supply side and argue that abundant
reserves and IOER reduced incentives for banks to lend (thereby fundamentally altering the
bank-lending channel).
A proper understanding of the bank-lending channel under the ‘new regime’ is
considered highly important for several reasons. Banks are the dominant provider of credit to
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small businesses that account for a significant portion of US employment and economic growth.
Banks furthermore operate the domestic payment system and bank lending is itself central to the
money supply (since bank loans create deposits) and overall financial conditions.
Following an extended period of slow economic expansion, the Fed continues to finetune its monetary policy implementation framework while evaluating additional nonconventional tools such as negative interest rates (Bernanke 2016) or price-level targeting
(Bernanke 2017). Possible changes to the monetary policy framework require an understanding
of their impact on the transmission mechanisms.
In this study, we investigate changes in bank lending portfolios with a view of identifying
implications for the operation of the bank-lending channel. It is important to note that bank
lending has undergone significant changes over the past 10 years. Overall the banking sector has
seen significant consolidation due to M&A activity (both a decline in the number of banks and
the rise of the G-SIBs) while banking institutions have moved away from pursuing specialization
in their financial services portfolio to embrace a diversified business model.
Specific to lending, diversification is always seen as key to managing credit losses,
however many banks are constrained in their diversification efforts. For example, smaller banks
often feel disadvantaged in their ability to diversify their credit risk by virtue of loan size
limitations and geographic insularity. The consolidation in the banking sector (supported by
changes in technology) have led to an increase in bank scale and a decrease in the heterogeneity
of business models.
The corresponding loss of heterogeneity in banking business models has profound
implications for the resilience of the sector and the transmission of monetary policy (Brissimis
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2010). Prior analyses focused on the implications for systemic risk, bank capital allocation, bank
liquidity (see here) and solvency.
We intend to analyze the nature of the rising homogeneity in bank lending portfolios with a view
on assessing its drivers and implications for the functioning of the bank-lending channel of
monetary policy.
3.2

Banking Business Models and Lending Practices

Business model is a general, integrative framework encompassing a firm’s strategies and
activities (Stowe 2018). It encompasses the day-to-day transactions that take place in the
organization. Business models have been used in the recent past as a significant metric while
developing and evaluating prospective banking regulation in Europe (Ayadi 2016). When the
regulatory bank deems certain sectors to have higher risk than others do, a look at the business
model of a bank will provide insight about the amount of risk that the bank has incurred, and
thus, help the regulatory body assign a risk value to the bank under review (Ayadi et al 2015).
Business models tend to be more continuous rather than static in nature, as they tend to evolve
around a multitude of possible strategies. Tuning the business models according to long term
effects like regulation has been found to bolster the bank’s performance in the past (Mergaerts
2016). Heterogeneous business models have also been studied under the lens of financial crisis
causes. Asset structures were found to be one of the root causes of the systemic risk before the
mortgage crisis, whereas the liability structure was found to be responsible for the crisis itself
(Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski 2017). Hence, business models are a very important aspect that can
help evaluate any future policies that the Federal Reserve may want to implement, and thus form
an integral part of our analysis. Banking in essence is liquidity transformation through the
creation of long-term loans and short-term 'money like' deposits. Thus, the lending function is
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the most important (biggest driver) of the entire enterprise. Lending activities are also the
essential transmitter of monetary policy signals to the real economy, hence our focus on the
analysis of the lending activities of commercial banks.
3.3

Methodology: Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis, an unsupervised learning technique, is ideal for conducting exploratory data
analysis and establishing patterns and commonalities within the data (Dardac and Boitan 2009).
It is particularly useful when the data is unlabeled. The idea behind clustering is to group the data
into ‘clusters’ in such a manner that each cluster is as homogeneous as possible while differing
from other clusters. Clustering is an ideal method for conducting our analysis as we are trying to
identify the existence of specific patterns of lending practices and thus, group the banks
according to them.
We use two kinds of clustering algorithms in our analysis. We primarily use of an
iterative partitioning, nonhierarchical cluster technique to form the bank clusters. The K-means
procedure iteratively assigns banks to clusters that minimize the sum of squared distances of the
bank attributes from their assigned cluster means (Stowe et al 2018). We make use of R and
Weka to run the cluster analysis and visualize the attained clusters. One of the biggest challenges
of using k-means clustering algorithm is to ascertain the optimal number of clusters denoted by
‘k’. To mitigate said issue we apply a two-fold approach, initially we apply density based spatial
clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) to generate clusters from the data. Unlike kmeans, DBSCAN does not need to know the number of clusters in data beforehand and uses a
distance measure to involuntarily generate clusters from the data. But sometimes it is a challenge
to interpret the clusters generated by DBSCAN, and so we also apply k-means to ensure our
results are robust and consistent. In addition, to ensure the number of clusters generated is
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optimal, we also make use of measures like sum of squared errors and R-square when applying
k-means clusters. These internal consistency measures have been used extensively in the past
literature as a viable means to choose the optimal number of clusters. We demonstrate the
relative sum of squared errors and R-squares associated with each algorithm running with a
different value of ‘k.’
The sum of squared errors is the square of the difference between each observation and
its allocated cluster center. For the optimal number of clusters, the value of SSE should be small,
along with a small value for k. R-square, on the other hand, represents the amount of variation in
data that the clustering model is able to capture. For the ideal scenario, we would like to get a
high value of R-square for a minimalistic value of ‘k’. Each of such clusters, thus obtained,
would be a representative of a business model.
3.3.1 Features used for clustering
To understand the lending behavior of banks over the years, we created variables that captured
different kinds of loans as a fraction of their total lending. We also created features to capture the
ratio, that the total loans given out by a bank have to its assets, and separately to its total deposits
respectively. Thus, we developed six features to use in our cluster analysis, which captured the
personal (PR), agricultural (AG), real estate (RE) and commercial and industrial loans (CI) along
with the loan to deposit ratio and the loan to assets ratio. These fractions ensured the
standardization of the banks’ lending, thus, ensuring the analysis results of the business models
would not be impacted by the difference in size of the banks.
To observe the evolution of the business models of banks, we decided to take a snapshot
from each passing decade in the data to create a panel. Hence, for each passing decade we loaded
the balance sheet information of all the banks in the last quarter. The snapshots that we used to
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conduct our analysis are as follows: 12/31/1979; 12/31/1989; 12/31/1999; 09/30/2007 and
12/31/2013. The 2007 snapshot helps to observe the lending behavior just before the global
crisis hit in December of 2007, then compare, and contrast it with the post crisis lending behavior
in 2013. For each of these balance sheets we consider specific features of the balance sheet data
or the derived aforementioned lending attributes.
We observe that the number of banks has been reducing with each passing decade.
Whereas, the average amount of assets being held by the banks in the system grows at a very fast
rate. We demonstrate this using Table 1 and Figure 2.
Table 1:Number of banks along with asset distribution over the years

Year

Number

Minimum

of Banks

1st

Median

Mean

Quantile

3rd

Maximum

Quantile

1980

14343

1002

11464

22997

117927

46580

1.06*108

1990

12567

1092

22283

44067

261849

93939

1.61*108

2000

8520

1239

37566

74948

667868

160466

5.71*108

2007

7220

1000

59020

124200

1511000

280500

1.32*109

2013

5816

3650

82510

163500

2323000

358600

1.94*109
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Figure 2: Plot of number of banks against the maximum assets

We also observe that each of the four lending variables have undergone some
transformations on their own as well. In Table 2 we present how the different lending variables
have changed over years. We observe that Personal lending especially has been reducing at a
steady rate and over the years. Agricultural and CI loans have been steadier but have also lost
some ground over the years as well. Real Estate lending, on the other hand, as can be seen from
Table 2, has grown significantly and has become the biggest lending channel for banks in the
system. We will be able to get more information on this transformation once we are able to study
the evolution of banking business models.
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Table 2: Average proportion of lending variables to total lending

Year

1980

1990

2000

2007

2013

Personal

0.16

0.11

0.08

0.05

0.03

Agricultural

0.08

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

Commercial & Industrial

0.11

0.11

0.11

0.10

0.09

Real Estate

0.20

0.25

0.35

0.45

0.42

Type of Loan

3.4

Results and Discussion

After we extract the balance sheets of all the banks for the aforementioned periods, we capture
the descriptive statistics of the four lending variables measuring banks’ lending behavior. We
present our findings below:
Table 3: Distribution of lending variables in 1980

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Personal

0.0

0.82

0.16

0.09

Agricultural

0.0

0.69

0.08

0.12

Commercial and Industrial

0.0

0.71

0.11

0.08

Real Estate

0.0

0.62

0.20

0.11
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Table 4: Distribution of lending variables in 1990

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Personal

0.0

1.0

0.11

0.09

Agricultural

0.0

0.62

0.05

0.08

Commercial and Industrial

0.0

0.68

0.11

0.08

Real Estate

0.0

0.81

0.25

0.13

Table 5: Distribution of lending variables in 2000

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Personal

0.0

1.0

0.08

0.08

Agricultural

0.0

0.66

0.05

0.09

Commercial and Industrial

0.0

0.94

0.11

0.08

Real Estate

0.0

0.96

0.35

0.16

Table 6: Distribution of lending variables in 2007

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Personal

0.0

1.0

0.05

0.06

Agricultural

0.0

0.57

0.05

0.08
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Table 6 (Continued)

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Commercial and Industrial

0.0

0.78

0.10

0.07

Real Estate

0.0

0.97

0.45

0.19

Table 7: Distribution of lending variables in 2013

Loan Type

Min

Max

Mean

Standard Deviation

Personal

0.0

0.97

0.03

0.05

Agricultural

0.0

0.57

0.05

0.08

Commercial and Industrial

0.0

0.76

0.09

0.07

Real Estate

0.0

0.88

0.42

0.17

As discussed earlier, choosing the optimal number of clusters is an empirical issue.
Therefore, to arrive at this optimal number we first performed a density-based cluster analysis to
get an initial set of ‘n’ clusters. We then performed multiple k-means cluster analysis on each of
the datasets, with the value of ‘k’ ranging from ‘n-2’ to ‘n+2’, captured from the DBSCAN
results. In order to arrive at the optimal value of ‘k’ for each dataset, we need to minimize the
total Sum of Squared errors as well as maximize R-square for a relatively low value of ‘k’.
Keeping both rules in mind, we plot the elbow curves for both SSE and R-square values against
the number of clusters, to arrive at the optimal number of clusters for each set of balance sheet
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data. The number of clusters thus, was varied from as low as two to as high as eight, by which
the curves plateaued. We present the summary statistics for numbers of clusters ranging from
two to eight in the tables below.
Table 8: Internal consistency measures for different values of ‘k’ for 1980 Balance Sheet data

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

SS7

SS8

Clusters

2

65.2

304.7

3

74.7

56.7

140.2

4

41.7

49.5

59.4

75.0

5

50.5

43.5

34.3

27.6

37.7

6

32.3

25.4

21.8

28.0

38.1

29.0

7

18.1

29.5

25.9

23.8

23.6

22.4

14.5

8

23.2

15.8

17.4

17.4

14.4

18.8

20.4

19.4

Total

R-

SSE

Square

369.9

0.36

271.6

0.53

225.6

0.61

193.6

0.67

174.6

0.70

157.8

0.73

146.8

0.75

From Table 8 we observe that the gain in variation reduces significantly after five
clusters. The drop in SSE is nearly half of the previous iterations and the gain in R-squared
shows a similar pattern. Thus, we consider that the optimal number of clusters for the 1980
balance sheet data is five. We also calculate the Bayesian Information criterion to ensure that we
have the optimal value of k.

28

Table 9: Internal consistency measures for different values of ‘k’ for 1990 Balance Sheet data

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

SS7

SS8

Clusters
2

124.4

224.4

3

63.2

143.2

72.9

4

41.2

47.3

82.4

63.4

5

51.1

31.o

25.1

53.8

35.0

6

39.7

25.9

29.1

27.7

25.7

19.0

7

31.2

2.6

19.5

24.5

18.5

22.7

27.3

8

2.6

20.9

23.5

17.2

12.3

16.6

18.4

22.7

Total

R-

SSE

Square

348.8

0.31

279.45

0.44

234.3

0.53

193.6

0.61

157.1

0.67

146.4

0.71

135.1

0.73

Table 10: Internal consistency measures for different values of ‘k’ for 2000 Balance Sheet data

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

Clusters
2

80.1

156.2

3

34.0

74.5

87.8

4

19.8

52.2

69.9

23.4

5

23.4

6.7

42.6

18.5

49.3

6

17.5

22.1

32.7

6.4

16.7

29

23.4

SS7

SS8

Total

R-

SSE

Square

236.3

0.38

196.3

0.49

165.8

0.57

140.5

0.63

118.6

0.68

Table 10 (Continued)

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

SS7

SS8

Clusters
7

23.7

6.2

10.7

13.8

15.7

21.0

15.1

8

19.9

13.6

11.9

1.5

8.3

10.1

16.9

14.4

Total

R-

SSE

Square

106.2

0.72

97.0

0.75

Table 11: Internal consistency measures for values of ‘k’ for 2007 Balance Sheet data

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

SS7

SS8

Clusters
2

112.0

70.6

3

67.2

24.4

46.6

4

22.6

13.9

40.2

41.6

5

29.8

9.4

12.2

22.1

29.1

6

18.7

9.9

11.8

16.3

24.8

8.4

7

11.1

18.8

9.6

6.1

13.4

11.3

12.3

8

9.5

11.0

13.3

8.4

11.7

6.0

1.3

30

11.3

Total

R-

SSE

Square

182.5

0.49

138.2

0.62

118.2

0.67

102.6

0.72

89.9

0.75

79.6

0.78

72.4

0.80

Table 12: Internal consistency measures for values of ‘k’ for 2013 Balance Sheet data

Number of

SS1

SS2

SS3

SS4

SS5

SS6

SS7

SS8

Clusters
2

78.0

48.8

3

45.1

17.8

34.8

4

10.4

27.7

28.7

15.0

5

15.7

18.8

8.9

8.4

19.7

6

12.2

5.4

8.8

8.3

11.0

16.9

7

12.2

8.4

9.0

5.3

9.9

8.1

1.9

8

9.2

8.1

7.9

7.0

5.1

6.8

3.7

1.9

Total

R-

SSE

Square

126.8

0.48

97.7

0.60

81.7

0.67

71.4

0.71

62.4

0.74

54.8

0.78

49.7

0.80

The observations for the other datasets with changing values for number of clusters is
presented in Table 9, Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12.
3.4.1 Changing Heterogeneity in Banking Business Models:
After arriving at the number of clusters for balance sheet data over the decades, let us look at the
key observations. Each cluster represents a specific business model. To analyze our results, we
have developed a business model naming convention. We have decided to name business models
according to the predominant lending types within the cluster. For example, if a cluster has a
higher than mean lending proportion in real estate and personal loans than the values for the Full
1980 bank data, then we call the business model ‘REPR’. However, if a cluster has a higher than
average lending proportion in real estate but the proportion of personal lending is close to but
less than the mean value (in Full data), we will call the cluster ‘REpr’. Let us now have a look at
how the bank lending practices have evolved over the years.
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3.4.2 Bank Lending Practices in 1980s
As demonstrated above, after performing cluster analysis, we arrived at the conclusion that the
optimal number of ‘k’ is five for the 1980 bank lending variables. With the naming convention
settled, let us have a look at the values for the lending variables from Table 13. We also present
the asset distribution for each of the clusters in Figure 3.
Table 13: Cluster centroids for lending variables for 1980 balance sheet data

Cluster #
Attribute

Full Data

0

1

2

3

4

(14343.0)

(4490.0)

(3027.0)

(1758.0)

(2816.0)

(2252.0)

Personal

0.1611

0.1509

0.2729

0.0802

0.1135

0.1537

Agricultural

0.0847

0.0321

0.0198

0.3527

0.1252

0.0168

CI

0.1129

0.0876

0.1018

0.0805

0.0862

0.2369

Real Estate

0.1981

0.3268

0.1717

0.0803

0.1405

0.1385

Figure 3: Asset distributions according to clusters for 1980 balance sheet data
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Cluster 0 ‘REpr’: The biggest cluster and hence, the most popular business model in the 1980
dataset is the ‘REpr’ business model with nearly 4500 banks (30 % of the market). They have a
high concentration of real estate loans along with a significant amount of personal lending. We
can also observe from Figure 3, that this cluster constitutes of mostly small banks in the 1980s.
Cluster 1 ‘PRcire’: The second biggest cluster constitutes of banks with the business model
‘PRcire’, which means they have significant personal lending along with a significant amount of
ci and real estate lending. The cluster constitutes of more than 3000 banks, which is more than
20 percent of the market. These banks also have relatively less assets.
Cluster 2 ‘Agricultural’: The smallest cluster constitutes of banks with the ‘Agricultural’
business model, which means they have significant agricultural lending. The cluster constitutes
of less than 2000 banks, which is around 12 percent of the market. These banks have the least
amount of assets amongst all other business models.
Cluster 3 ‘agcire’: The fourth cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘agcire’,
which means they have agricultural lending along with some amounts of ci and real estate
lending. The cluster constitutes of nearly 3000 banks, which is around 20 percent of the market.
These banks also have relatively less assets but also are not very keen on lending a significant
part of their assets.
Cluster 4 ‘CIpr’: The last cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘CIpr’, which
means they have significant commercial and industrial lending along with a significant amount
of personal lending. The cluster constitutes of more than 2000 of the biggest banks in the market.
From Figure 3 it is evident that this business model was the most popular one amongst the
biggest banks (in terms of assets) during the 1980s.
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3.4.3 Bank Lending Practices in 1990s
The optimal number of ‘k’ is six for the 1990 bank lending variables. Personal and Agricultural
lending have become less popular whereas Real Estate lending has gained favor. Let us then
have a look at values for the lending variables in Table 14. We also present the asset distribution
for each of the clusters in Figure 4.
Cluster 0 ‘REpr’: The biggest cluster and hence, the most popular business model in the 1990
dataset is the ‘REpr’ business model again with nearly 3900 banks (31 % of the market). They
have a moderately high concentration of real estate loans along with a significant amount of
personal lending. We can also observe from Figure 4, that this cluster constitutes of mostly small
and mid-sized banks in the 1990s.
Table 14: Cluster centroids for lending variables for 1990 balance sheet data

Cluster #
Attribute

Full Data

0

1

2

3

4

5

(12567.0)

(3897.0)

(1833.0) (1439.0) (2058.0)

(467.0) (2873.0)

Personal

0.1088

0.126

0.1012

0.0587

0.0905

0.4201

0.078

Agricultural

0.0516

0.0257

0.0102

0.2434

0.0087

0.01

0.0544

CI

0.1094

0.0905

0.2633

0.0692

0.1002

0.08

0.0682

Real Estate

0.2484

0.2896

0.221

0.133

0.4618

0.1559

0.13

Cluster 1 ‘CIrepr’: The second biggest cluster constitutes of banks with the business model
‘CIrepr’, which means they have significant commercial and industrial lending along with a
significant amount of personal and real estate lending. The cluster constitutes of more than 1800
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banks, which is 15 percent of the market. This business model was popular amongst the biggest
banks with the largest amount of assets in the 1990s.
Cluster 2 ‘Agricultural’: The third cluster constitutes of banks with the ‘Agricultural’ business
model, which means they have significant amount of agricultural lending. The cluster constitutes
of around 1500 banks, which is around 11 percent of the market. These banks have the least
amount of assets amongst all other business models.

Figure 4: Asset distributions according to clusters for 1990 balance sheet data

Cluster 3 ‘REprci’: The fourth cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘REprci’,
which means they have a very high amount of Real Estate lending along with some amounts of
ci and real estate lending. The cluster constitutes of just more than 2000 banks, which is around
16 percent of the market. These banks also have relatively low to medium amount of assets.
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Cluster 4 ‘PR’: The penultimate cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘PR’, which
means they lent nearly half of their assets as personal lending. The cluster constitutes of less than
500 banks in the market.
Cluster 5 ‘NONE’: The last cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘NONE’, which
means they did not lend out a significant amount of their assets. The cluster constitutes of nearly
3000 banks, which is around a quarter of the market. These banks also have low to medium level
of assets but are not keen on lending.
3.4.4 Bank Lending Practices in 2000s:
The optimal number of ‘k’ is four for the banks during 2000. We observe that personal lending
has become even less popular whereas Real estate lending has increased further. In addition,
there is nearly a 33 percent drop in the number of banks in the system. We report our findings in
Table 15. We present the cluster-wise asset distribution in Figure 5.
Table 15: Cluster centroids for lending variables for 2000 balance sheet data

Cluster #
Attribute

Full Data

0

1

2

3

(8520.0)

(1758.0)

(3428.0)

(2159.0)

(1175.0)

Pers

0.0835

0.1234

0.0854

0.0608

0.06

Agri

0.0541

0.0333

0.0292

0.0121

0.2349

CI

0.1055

0.1029

0.1264

0.0861

0.0843

Real

0.3487

0.1635

0.365

0.5451

0.2172

Cluster 0 ‘prcire’: The first cluster follows the ‘prcire’ business model with nearly 1800 banks
(21 % of the market). They have a moderately high concentration of commercial and industrial
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loans along with a significant amount of personal and real estate lending. We can also observe
from Figure 5 that this cluster constitutes of mostly mid-sized banks in the 2000s.

Figure 5: Asset distributions according to clusters for 2000 balance sheet data

Cluster 1 ‘REprci’: The second cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘REprci’,
which means they have a very high amount of Real Estate lending along with some amounts of
ci and real estate lending. The cluster constitutes of nearly 3500 banks, which is 40 percent of the
market. This business model was popular amongst the banks with the greatest amount of assets.
Cluster 2 ‘Real Estate’: The third cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘Real
Estate’, which means they have a very high amount of Real Estate lending. The cluster
constitutes of just more than 2000 banks, which is around 25 percent of the market. These banks
have relatively low to medium amount of assets.
Cluster 3 ‘Agricultural’: The fourth cluster constitutes of banks with the ‘Agricultural’ business
model, which means they have significant amount of agricultural lending. The cluster constitutes
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of around 1200 banks, which is around 14 percent of the market. These banks have the least
amount of assets amongst all other business models.
Another interesting observation for this decade’s balance sheet is the popularity of
securities amongst the banks. Banks invested heavily in securities during this decade as can be
observed in Figure 6. This in essence demonstrates the rise of mortgage backed securities and its
popularity amongst the banks in early 2000s. Looking over the distribution per business model, it
is quite evident that clusters 1 and 2, which comprise of the biggest banks in the market invested
heavily in the securities.

Figure 6: Distribution of Securities per cluster for 2000 Balance Sheet data

3.4.5 Bank Lending: Pre-Crisis Lending behavior
The optimal value of ‘k’ for the balance sheet data on 09.30.2007 is three. At first glance it is
visible that modes of lending have plateaued apart from Real Estate lending, which became even
more popular. The total number of banks in the system also reduced. Let us then have a look at
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the centroids of clusters for the lending variables in Table 16. We present the asset distribution
for each of the clusters in Figure 7.
Table 16: Cluster centroids for lending variables for 2007 balance sheet data

Cluster #
Attribute

Full Data

0

1

2

(7220.0)

(849.0)

(2744.0)

(3627.0)

Pers

0.047

0.0466

0.0657

0.033

Agri

0.0455

0.2281

0.0332

0.012

CI

0.1023

0.0949

0.1078

0.0998

Real

0.4528

0.2665

0.3108

0.6037

Figure 7: Asset distributions according to clusters for 2007 balance sheet data
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Cluster 0 ‘Agricultural’: The first and smallest cluster constitutes of banks with the
‘Agricultural’ business model, which means they have significant amount of agricultural lending.
The cluster constitutes of less than 900 banks, which is around 12 percent of the market. These
banks have the least amount of assets amongst all other business models.
Cluster 1 ‘recipr’: The second biggest cluster constitutes of banks with the business model
‘recipr’. They have a moderately high concentration of real estate loans along with a significant
amount of personal and CI lending. The cluster constitutes of more than 2700 banks, which is 38
percent of the market. This business model was popular amongst the biggest banks with the
largest amount of assets in 2007.
Cluster 2 ‘Real Estate’: The third cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘Real
Estate’, which means they have a very high amount of Real Estate lending. As can be seen from
Figure 7 and Table 16 during 2007, half of all the banks in the system had more than 60 percent
of their assets lent out through real estate. These banks had relatively low to medium amount of
assets.
3.4.6 Bank Lending: Post crisis lending behavior
The optimal value of ‘k’ for the balance sheet data on 12.31.2013 is three. All mediums of
lending have seen a decrease in the past decade. The total number of banks have also reduced.
Let us then have a look at the centroids of clusters for the lending variables in Table 17. We also
present the asset distribution for each of the clusters in Figure 8.
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Table 17: Cluster centroids for lending variables for 2013 balance sheet data

Cluster #
Attribute

Full Data

0

1

2

(5816.0)

(2975.0)

(2167.0)

(674.0)

Personal

0.0333

0.024

0.0464

0.0327

Agricultural

0.0457

0.014

0.0321

0.228

CI

0.0855

0.0863

0.0853

0.0823

Real Estate

0.4239

0.5576

0.2877

0.2723

Figure 8: Asset distributions according to clusters for 2013 balance sheet data

Cluster 0 ‘Real Estate’: The first cluster constitutes of banks with the business model ‘Real
Estate’, which means they have a very high amount of Real Estate lending. We can see from
Table 17 that more than half of the banks had more than 55 percent of their assets lent out
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through real estate. These banks had relatively low to medium amount of assets as can be seen
from Figure 8.
Cluster 1 ‘recipr’: The second biggest cluster constitutes of banks with the business model
‘recipr’. They have a moderate concentration of real estate loans along with personal and CI
lending. The cluster constitutes of more than 2000 banks, which is 37 percent of the market. This
business model was again the most popular amongst the biggest banks with the largest amount of
assets in 2013 as can be seen from Figure 8.
Cluster 2 ‘AGre’: The last and smallest cluster constitutes of banks with the ‘AGre’ business
model, which means they have significant amount of agricultural lending along with some real
estate lending. The cluster constitutes of less than 700 banks, which is around 12 percent of the
market. These banks have the least amount of assets amongst all other business models.
3.5

Conclusions

The goal of this research is to uncover commercial bank business models through cluster
analysis. Detailed regulatory snapshots of bank balance sheet data are used to derive a small set
of bank lending features for clustering, including personal, agricultural, real estate and
commercial and industrial loans. These snapshots are taken each decade and considered
chronologically to better understand trends in the banking industry. Some of the key findings are
listed below.
The number of commercial banks has dramatically declined from 1980 (14,343 banks)
through 2013 (5,816 banks). Commercial bank business models have become more uniform or
homogeneous with respect to lending activities. The number of clusters representing specific
business models dropped from 5 and 6 in the 1980s and 1990s to 3 by 2013.
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Characterizing banking business models is part of a larger research initiative focusing on
agent-based modeling and simulation. A coarse-grained model of the Federal funds market aims
to better understand the overall effects as the Federal Reserve pursues monetary policy
normalization. A more fine-grained model of the inter-bank lending market focuses on
highlighting how stress might appear in the banking sector as quantitative tightening escalates.
Understanding banking business models is key to building better agent-based models, especially
the fine-grained banking model. The agents can be instantiated using realistic balance sheet data
(from any given snapshot) but understanding the business model contributes directly to better
behavioral implementations. Finally, interpreting simulation results is made easier when able to
group banks by business models and clarify patterns. Unsupervised learning methods such as
cluster analysis seem like a natural fit for this business model discovery challenge given the
promising results achieved to date.
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CHAPTER 4. AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET
The Great Recession (2007-2009) and reverberating effects during the global financial crisis had
profound impacts on the US Federal Reserve system, especially the Federal funds market. In
response to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve took unprecedented action, along with other
major central banks. In particular, the Fed responded by lowering the target Federal funds rate,
providing credit to financial institutions, and eventually engaging in a series of large-scale asset
purchase programs comprising quantitative easing (QE). As the Federal Reserve seeks to unwind
its positions, the impacts of monetary policy normalization are a matter of wide-ranging debate.
Clearly, the US Federal Reserve and counterparts around the world will continue to use
traditional economic models to better understand unfolding challenges and evaluate proposed
policy alternatives. This study looks at adding agent-based modeling and simulation to the
toolkit. In particular, an hierarchical of coarse-grained and fine-grained models are used to
simulate monetary policy normalization.
In this chapter we present a hierarchical agent-based model of the federal funds market.
The model comprises of a coarse-grained sectoral flow of funds model and a fine-grained model
of the US banking sector. We use the hierarchical model to simulate the effects of policies on the
underlying agent environment and proactively evaluate the effects of said policies. We first
present a background of both of these models followed by a discussion on the monetary policy
normalization, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and Liquidity conditions. We then present a
snapshot of the Federal Reserve monetary policies with a special focus on pre-crisis policy and
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consequently the post crisis response. We then present a brief discussion about the Federal
Reserve System model (FED) and the Interbank Loan network model (BNK) and discuss how
the two are intertwined and integrated in the current setting. We instantiate the BNK model and
test out some of the policy effects using simulation. We present our findings later in this chapter.
4.1

Background

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and reverberating effects during the Great Recession had
profound impacts on financial markets and the monetary system. In response to the crisis, central
banks around the world took unprecedented action in order to ease financial conditions. In the
US, the Federal Reserve (Fed) responded by providing credit to financial institutions, lowering
interest rates (through the target federal funds rate), providing additional forward guidance, and
eventually engaging in a series of large-scale asset purchase programs known as quantitative
easing (QE). As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet has undergone a more than five-fold increase
since the start of the crisis, with total assets growing from roughly $850 billion to more than $4.5
trillion and banking reserves expanding from $20 billion to more than $2 trillion. At this point,
the Federal Reserve has embarked on a program of monetary policy normalization which implies
an unwinding of these extraordinary positions.
The impact of this new phase of monetary policy normalization is a matter of wideranging debate. While the Fed has acted cautiously and been quite transparent about its gradual
approach toward reducing the balance sheet, significant uncertainty around the effects of the
unwind remains. The exact impact on financial markets and institutions depends on the actions
(and reactions) of all financial system participants. Policy normalization will unfold from a
unique starting point, at a time when the US Treasury is embarking on a significant fiscal
stimulus program and within a new untested regulatory environment. There is little or no
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historical precedent to inform policy makers about the range (and likelihood) of possible
scenarios. So, debate is understandable, but what tools are available to help us evaluate policy
alternatives?
Clearly, the US Federal Reserve and counterparts around the world will continue to use
existing models to better understand unfolding challenges and evaluate proposed policy
alternatives. This study looks at adding agent-based modeling and simulation to the toolkit. We
present a collection of agent-based models to assess the implications of the reserve drain
resulting from the unwind of the Fed’s balance sheet:
• A sectoral (aggregate) flow of funds model (FED) explores the speed with which banking
reserves are expected to decline, based on the Fed’s communicated SOMA portfolio unwind plan
and using basic portfolio assumptions across all sectoral agents (including the US Treasury,
GSEs and foreign central banks).
• The sectoral flow of funds model is combined with a granular agent-based model of the US
banking sector (BNK) in order to analyze the impact of the decline in reserves on banks. The
granular bank model implements basic actions (and constraints) for banks and non-bank private
sector agents and focuses on the emergence of stress triggered by liquidity constraints and
signaled through interbank lending activity (Fed Funds market). We use regulatory balance sheet
data to model the many types of banks and associated business models that influence decision
making.
The overall goal is to develop agent-based models that support simulation as a
complement to traditional economic models for policy evaluation.
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4.2

Monetary Policy Normalization and the Fed’s Balance Sheet

The past decade of accommodative monetary policy has contributed to lower interest rates, a
reduction in financial risk premia and a significant increase in macro liquidity (as measured by
the monetary base). While it is generally assumed that the shift to a restrictive stance will have
an opposing effect on all three variables, discussions among market participants initially focused
on the implications for interest rates and risk premia. Recent developments in global money
markets (e.g. widening of the FRA-OIS spread) have pushed the implications of a reduction in
liquidity to the front of the agenda.
As the Fed unwinds the assets on its balance sheet through maturities of US Treasury
debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, other investors will have to step in and finance the
debt roll over. When private sector agents (banks and non-bank entities) finance assets rolling off
the Fed’s balance sheet, bank reserves are reduced.
The capacity of the banking sector to adjust to rapidly decreasing reserves is uncertain
however. Following the financial crisis, significant new legislation was enacted (2010 Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) aimed at curbing risk taking and promoting
resilience in the financial system. A key goal has been to make banks more resistant to liquidity
risk through the introduction of new liquidity-based constraints such as the LCR (Liquidity
Coverage Ratio) and NSFR (Net Stable Funds Ratio). The new liquidity regulation led to a
significant increase in the demand for bank reserves. Any reduction of reserves beyond the level
dictated by the banking sector’s liquidity driven demand could prove hugely disruptive to the
financial system (forcing the Fed to halt its balance sheet unwind).
Among officials and industry practitioners, estimates of the required aggregate reserves
vary widely, with some analyses putting the level below $600 billion, while others assume a
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significantly higher amount (between $1.0 to $1.5 trillion). In a recent speech at the Hoover
Institution’s Monetary Policy Conference, Randal Quarles (Federal Reserve Vice Chairman for
Supervision) acknowledged the uncertainty around reserve requirements: “So, how many more
reserve balances can be drained, and how small will the Fed’s balance sheet get? Let me
emphasize that this question is highly speculative—policymakers have not decided the desired
long-run size of the Fed’s balance sheet, nor, as I noted earlier, do we have a definitive handle on
banks’ long-run demand for reserve balances. Indeed, FOMC [Federal Open Market Committee]
has said that it ‘expects to learn more about the underlying demand for reserves during the
process of balance sheet normalization.”
While the Fed’s balance sheet unwind will (ceteris paribus) lead to a significant reduction
in the level of reserves, it is important to note that the level of banking reserves is affected by
additional dynamics, unrelated to the Fed’s balance sheet unwind. Over any given period, a
reserve drain occurs when there is a net flow of funds from the private sector (banks and nonbank entities) to non-private sector agents, which include the US Treasury, foreign central banks
and other entities that maintain deposit accounts at the Federal Reserve (participating in the
FedWire payment system). We intend to analyze the effect of the Fed’s balance sheet unwind
within the broader context of these dynamics, including the effects of the following forces.
• Fiscal policy: the US Treasury’s fiscal stimulus program is expected to have a significant
impact on liquidity, affecting the overall level of liquidity as well as its distribution across
financial system participants.
• Monetary policy: in addition to the SOMA portfolio unwind, banking reserves are impacted by
changes in private sector “Reverse Repo Program” balances (RRP). Furthermore, increases in the
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amount of currency in circulation (keeping pace with GDP growth and other sources of increased
currency demand) are offset by decreases in bank reserves.
• Foreign central bank reserve portfolio management is also a factor, as impacted by the
dynamics of global trade and the relative performance of foreign economies.
• Finally, the impact of declining reserves on wider financial conditions is a function of the many
portfolio balancing decisions made by private sector agents (including banks and non-bank
entities). This sector is made up of a large number of individual entities with very different
business models, a natural fit for agent-based modeling and simulation.
In combination with the Fed SOMA portfolio unwind, the first three items affect the
speed with which reserves leave the system. Associated dynamics are incorporated in the coarsegrained sectoral flow of funds (FED) model. The implications of private sector agent decisions
are modeled through the granular banking (BNK) model which aims to analyze the emergence of
stress triggered by liquidity constraints and signaled through interbank lending activity (Fed
Funds market). Given the uncertainty around the banking sector’s need for reserves in the new
regulatory environment, it is anticipated that regulators will be closely monitoring developments
in interbank lending markets in order to detect clues about banks’ underlying demand for
reserves. One of the critical indicators of stress can be found in the Fed Funds market, where
banks interact to borrow and lend excess reserves. As noted by analysts at Goldman Sachs in a
recent report, monitoring buildup of stress may turn out to be somewhat complicated in practice
as “The Fed will want to end the normalization before reserves become scarce to maintain a
precautionary buffer that ensures the floor system remains effective as both banks’ need for
reserves and the volume of non-reserve liabilities fluctuate.” We posit that agent-based
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simulation methods can provide valuable perspective here, as they allow us to project the timing
and circumstances of systemic stress buildup due to reserve draining.
As further noted by Randal Quarles, “banks currently display a significant degree of
heterogeneity in their approaches to meeting their liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirements,
including in their chosen volumes of reserve balances. This finding suggests that there likely is
no single ‘representative bank’ behavioral model that can capture all we might want to know
about banks’ demand for central bank reserve balances.” In order to address the heterogeneity of
bank business models and its impact on liquidity stress, we develop a fine-grained agent-based
model of the US banking sector. The fine-grained banking model captures the behavior of
individual banks and their operations in the Fed Funds market Integration with the coarsegrained FED model allows for a granular view on liquidity risk buildup and propagation.
4.3

Monetary Policy and the Fed Funds Market

The US Federal Reserve System (Fed) was established through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913
to provide the nation with a safer and more flexible financial system. As such, the Fed is
responsible for the conduct of monetary policy (focused on the dual goals of stable prices and
maximum employment) and ensuring the stability of the financial system (as well as the safety
and soundness of individual institutions).
In its conduct of monetary policy, the Fed targets the level of interest rates in money
markets, which are an essential part of the plumbing of the financial system Chalermchatvichien
et al. (2014). Money markets are wholesale markets for low-risk, short-term IOUs. They operate
as networks of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries who borrow and lend amongst
themselves for relatively short maturities. Under normal market conditions, money markets
exhibit high liquidity and transaction volumes.
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Within money markets, the Feds main operational target is the Federal funds rate, the
overnight interest rate at which banks (and other eligible institutions) lend reserve balances
(deposits kept at Federal Reserve banks) to each other in the Fed funds market.
In guiding the Fed funds rate to its target level, the Fed historically has used open market
operations which change the amount of reserves in the system (altering the supply). Open market
operations rely on two key features: reserve requirements and reserve scarcity Carpenter et al.
(2015).
Reserve requirements create demand for Federal Reserve balances as banks are required
to hold a fraction of their deposits in reserves at the Fed. The Fed controls the supply of reserves
and generally has kept overall reserve balances scarce, fostering an active interbank lending
market and allowing the Fed to affect the market-determined level of the Fed funds rate by
making small changes in the supply of aggregate reserves. Figure 1 highlights the scarcity of
reserves prior to 2007, with excess reserves (the amount by which the total available reserves
exceed required reserves) hovering below $2 billion USD.

Figure 9: Excess reserves of depository institutions (source: Federal Reserve).
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In 2007/2008, the US financial system faced an imminent crisis which required an
aggressive response from the Federal Reserve. The Fed responded by lowering the target Federal
funds rate and providing credit to financial institutions. When the Fed funds rate reached its zerolower bound, the Fed expanded its operational framework to include “non-conventional”
measures, including forward guidance and the implementation of large-scale asset purchase
programs (known as “‘quantitative easing” or QE). The unconventional policy measures aimed
at providing additional monetary accommodations by putting downward pressure on longer-term
interest rates. While the Federal Reserve maintained an accommodative monetary policy,
significant new regulations were enacted aimed at strengthening the liquidity and solvency of
financial institutions.
The Fed’s QE programs led to an abundant supply of new reserves. Figure 1 clearly
shows that post 2008, excess reserves increased from $2 billion USD to more than $2.6 trillion
USD. With reserves no longer scarce, the fundamental structure of the Fed funds market changed
and the Fed was required to implement new tools for its conduct of monetary policy. In
December 2015, the Fed started the process of monetary policy normalization by raising its
short-term interest rate target. In a world without reserve scarcity, traditional open market
operations are no longer effective and the Fed resorted to paying depository institutions interest
on excess reserves in order to provide a floor for the Fed funds rate.
In October 2017, the Fed embarked on the second leg of its monetary policy
normalization efforts, aimed at reducing the overall size of its balance sheet. The Fed laid out a
gradual approach to reducing its balance sheet, using phased out re-investment of maturing
positions in its Treasury and agency debt portfolio. As the Fed pares down its balance sheet,
portfolio maturities that are refinanced by the private sector trigger an equivalent decrease in the
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amount of reserves in the system. The expected draining of excess reserves will proceed in a
regulatory environment that is significantly different from the pre-crisis era.
New post-crisis regulations (including the minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and
net stable funding ratio (NSFR)) placed additional constraints on bank liquidity risk profiles. The
minimum LCR rule requires banks to maintain high quality liquid assets (HQLA) in excess of
the expected loss of funding under stressed conditions (measured over a 30-day period). The
need to maintain a minimum amount of HQLA boosted bank demand for reserves. At the end of
the 3rd quarter of 2017, the eight global systemically important banks (G-Sibs) in the US held a
combined $2.4 trillion of HQLA, with reserves accounting for 48% of that amount. While
individual banks are affected in different ways (and to varying degrees), the banking sectors
response to reserve draining is expected to re-invigorate the Fed funds market which—according
to market participants—may come under significant stress prior to the Fed reaching its stated
long-term balance sheet goal.
4.3.1 Pre-Crisis Monetary Policy
In the years leading up to the crisis, the Fed operated a balance sheet under $900 billion. Figure 2
includes a high-level view of the Feds balance sheet as of January 25, 2007. At that time, the
Fed’s securities portfolio stood at $797.5 billion (“Securities”), with total banking reserves at
$6.25 billion (“Reserves”).
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Figure 10: Federal Reserve balance sheet as of January 25, 2007

In this environment of scarce reserves, the Fed conducted monetary policy through open
market operations, increasing reserves when targeting a lower Fed funds rate (decreasing
reserves when targeting a higher rate).
In its open market operations, the Fed adds to (sells from) its securities holdings, leading
to an increase (decrease) in banking reserves. Figure 3 includes a schematic overview of the
impact of open market operations on the balance sheets of the main entities (including the Fed,
the banking sector and the non-bank private sector). We highlight major balance sheet changes
that occur when the Fed targets a decrease in the Fed funds rate and sells Treasury Notes
(“UST”) to reduce the amount of reserves in the system.

Figure 11: Illustrative balance sheet changes following Fed open market
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4.3.2 Crisis Response: Quantitative Easing (QE)
The three successive rounds of QE led to an expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet. Figure 12
highlights the size and composition of the Feds balance sheet as of September 28, 2017 (numbers
in millions). Note the increase of the balance sheet to $4.5 trillion, with securities holdings at
$4.4 trillion and reserves at $2.2 trillion.

Figure 12: Federal Reserve balance sheet as of September 28, 2017

The impact of QE on balance sheets of the various entities is outlined in Figure 13
(assumes the banking sector is the ultimate seller of securities) and Figure 14 (assumes the public
as the ultimate seller).

Figure 13: Illustrative balance sheet changes resulting from QE
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Figure 14: Illustrative balance sheet changes resulting from QE

4.4

FED: The Federal Reserve System Model

The coarse-grained FED model includes the major participants in the Federal Reserve system.
All entities that maintain USD accounts at the Fed (i.e. entities holding Fed issued deposits) are
modeled using five representative agents. In addition to the Federal Reserve itself, the model
includes agent classes for the US Treasury, banking sector, non-banking private sector (including
the general public), GSEs and foreign central banks. One objective of our model is to accurately
implement the mechanisms that result in changes to the balance sheets of these market
participants. To that end, the model includes simplified balance sheets and behaviors for each of
these agents and captures the resulting aggregate flow of funds. This coarse-grained model
(FED) is combined with a fine-grained banking model (BNK) to create a high-fidelity
hierarchical model of the Fed funds market. The outline below lists all the agent classes used in
the FED model.
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• Federal Reserve: Currently a single agent represents the Federal Reserve, or more accurately
the aggregate balance sheet, even though there are a dozen individual Federal Reserve district
banks spread across the country.
• US Treasury: The Treasury is also represented as a single agent, which maintains a deposit
account at the Federal Reserve and issues Treasury bonds. All the Treasury’s publicly issued
bonds are held by the agents in the coarse-grained model: Fed, banking sector, non-banking
private sector, GSEs and foreign central banks.
• Banking Sector: This serves as a high-level aggregate representative bank covering domestic
banks as well as subsidiaries and affiliates of foreign banks. Basically, a single agent is used to
present a unified balance sheet in the coarse-grained model. When coupled with the fine-grained
bank model, this aggregate banking sector captures otherwise unspecified banks (the remainder
in the sector). When run without the fine-grained bank model, the banking sector agent models
the entire universe of banks through a single representative agent.
• Non-Banking Private Sector: This is a single agent that represents the general balance sheet
of all non-bank private sector entities (here “the public”). As outlined above, net new purchases
of US Treasury notes by the public have a significant impact on the banking sector as they result
in a loss of reserves but also in an overall contraction of the banking sector (loss of valuable
client deposits). Net new purchases of US Treasuries by the banking sector do not lead to a contraction of banking sector balance sheets, but only results in a change in the composition of bank
assets (substitution of reserves with US Treasury notes).
• Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): This serves as a high-level aggregate agent
covering the various government sponsored enterprises that hold accounts directly at the Fed.
GSEs include mortgage agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) and the system of
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Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). Similar to the aggregate banking sector agent, when
coupled with the fine-grained bank model, this aggregate agent captures otherwise unspecified
entities. When run without the fine-grained bank model, the agent models the entire universe of
GSEs through a single representative agent.
• Foreign Central Banks: This serves as a high-level aggregate agent covering all various
foreign central banks holding accounts at the Fed. Similar to the banking sector and GSE coarsegrained agents, the central bank agent captures the aggregate behavior of any central bank not
individually specified in the fine-grained model. When run without the fine-grained model, this
agent models the entire universe of foreign central banks through a single representative agent.
The simplest version of this model implements these six agent classes: the Federal
Reserve, the US Treasury, regulated banks, the public (or non-banks), GSEs and foreign central
banks. This minimal agent landscape can capture essential behaviors such as changes to the
balance sheets while the Federal Reserve pursues quantitative easing or tightening policies.
4.4.1 FED: Preliminary Simulation Results
The coarse-grained, six agent model of the Federal Reserve system was tested by simulating the
basic responses to major policy actions (as outlined in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). In first case
shown here, the Federal Reserve stopped re-investing maturing Treasury notes and the banking
sector steps in to buy newly issued notes. Figure 14 shows the balance sheet changes over time.
Note that the banking sector agent (Bks) swaps reserve balances for Treasury securities, while
the Federal Reserve agent (Fed) echoes the decline in reserves. The Fed decline in Treasury
securities reflects the maturing notes rolling off the balance sheet.
Figure 15 shows the balance sheet changes as the public (non-banking sector) steps in as
the ultimate buyer of newly issued notes. Figure 16 shows the balance sheet changes associated
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with this potential scenario. The public agent (Pub) uses deposits to purchase new securities (as
shown in the lower left panel). The banking sector shows a corresponding decline in deposits (as
the public withdraws funds) and a drop-in reserve balance. The Fed also shows an associated
decline in reserve balances. Again, the Fed decline in Treasury securities reflects maturing notes.
These balance sheet changes are an important check on the ABM implementation.

Figure 15: Agent balance sheet changes as new securities are purchased by banking sector

4.5

Integrating the FED and BNK Models

The high-level Federal Reserve model is integrated with the fine-grained banking model through
changes in the size and scope of three agents in the FED model representing the banking sector,
GSEs and foreign central banks. As the number of detailed bank agents in the BNK model is
increased (based on a simulation parameter), the balance sheet of the banking sector agent in the
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FED model is reduced. The banking sector agent basically becomes an “otherwise unspecified”
class that handles the remaining balance sheet. Therefore, more nuanced behaviors can be
captured as more detailed banking agents are instantiated. Currently, we are using FDIC
regulatory data that covers all commercial banks, but can expand the coverage to include savings
and loans, credit unions and other institutions. Based on the FDIC data, the bank class is
instantiated as individual banks using real balance sheet data from a selected point in time. One
of the parameters is the number of agent banks, which are instantiated in descending order based
on total assets. For example, the simulations can be run with the 100 largest banks as agents.
During simulations, the banking agents in the BNK model individually respond to Federal
Reserve actions. In addition to the actions of individual banks in the BNK model, agents in the
coarse-grained FED model provide aggregate “representative agent” modeled responses.

Figure 16: Agent balance sheet changes as new securities are purchased by public sector
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4.6

BNK: The Interbank Loan Network

The fine-grained model is based on detailed regulatory data for US commercial banks. In order
to create a high-fidelity ensemble model, the general Federal Reserve system agents are
combined with a fine-grained model of the banking network. The agent landscape includes
thousands of individual banks, government sponsored entities, foreign offices and primary
dealers as outlined below.
• Banks: The regulated banks populate the model at a fine-grained level. Balance sheet data for
individual banks from the FDIC “call reports” are used to give the agents very realistic starting
positions. The balance sheet data can be drawn from different points in time, so the simulations
can mirror different historical situations like pre and post crisis scenarios. Currently, the data
being used is based on prior work (see Drechsler 2017). The detailed balance sheet data for more
than 5,000 banks allows the very different business models and behaviors to emerge in the
simulations.
• Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): A small group of GSEs such as Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and the FHLB (Federal Home Loan Bank) system play a role in the
Federal Reserve system. These entities cannot borrow in the Fed funds market but can lend
money.
• Foreign Central Banks: These foreign banks also play a large role in the Federal Reserve
system, mostly as buyers of US Treasury notes. These banks do not participate in the Fed funds
market. Note: In the fine-grained model, the major central banks from around the world will be
modeled separately based on actual balance sheet data.
• Primary Dealers: The primary dealers are the sell-side agents in the Treasury market. The
Federal Reserve cannot buy directly from the Treasury in the primary market and is limited to
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secondary market trading through a network of primary dealers. This agent class is introduced to
provide counter parties in the purchase of Treasury notes.
Of course, the bank class is instantiated as individual banks using real balance sheet data
from selected point in time. One of the parameters is the number of bank agent banks, which are
instantiated in descending order based on total assets. For example, the simulations can be run
with the 100 largest banks as agents or thousands of banks from the largest to very small firms.
The differences in balance sheets drives different behaviors on behalf of individual agents
(basically banks with different business models).
4.7

Preliminary Results

The financial crisis (2007-2009) certainly affected the Federal Reserve and interbank lending
market. In fact, overnight lending froze as uncertainty rippled throughout the banking network
and wider financial system. One important way to test agent-based models is to verify that key
behavioral responses emerge given the appropriate inputs. The financial crisis provides a
compelling natural experiment. As the Federal Reserve pursued quantitative easing, banking
reserves grew until the system was awash in money. At this point, borrowing made little sense as
way for a bank to meet reserve requirements, so overnight lending ceased.
Does the model exhibit the same emergent behaviors? The minimal BNK model noted
above is used to test this proposition, with 100 agents representing the largest banks. The
simulation was run for 50 ticks, corresponding to business or trading days. Figure 17 summarizes
the lending activity as end-of-day (EOD) loan tallies per simulation tick. Note that loan activity
drops as the Federal Reserve pursues an easy money policy, adding excess reserves to the
banking sector. All lending ceases a few ticks past 30 in the simulation.
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Does loan activity start again once the Federal Reserve tightens? Lending should resume
once bank reserves are lowered enough that liquidity constraints become binding again. This is
exactly what happens in the simulation (see Figure 18). Basically, the Federal Reserve agent
begins reducing its balance sheet, thereby reducing the excess reserves. As some banks bump up
against regulatory liquidity constraints, overnight borrowing from other banks with excess
reserves starts again. These two simple experiments build confidence in the model,
demonstrating fundamental behaviors in response to major events.
The results above confirm basic model behaviors with respect to the bank agents. The
quantitative easing and tightening represent pre and post crisis scenarios that are good guideposts
for more nuanced simulation experiments to come.

Figure 17: The impact of quantitative easing on loan activity.
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Figure 18: The impact of quantitative tightening on loan activity.

One next step is to make sure the balance sheet changes outlined above are properly
captured in the simulations. Ultimately, this agent-based model should provide an interesting tool
for policy evaluation. Simulation runs could look at various policy alternatives and parameter
settings in concert with more traditional economic models. For instance, the Federal Reserve
started paying interest on excess reserves (IOER) as a way to regain some control over the
Federal funds rate.
Once the system was awash in excess reserves, there was no meaningful way for the
Federal Reserve to affect this rate. By implementing this new IOER mechanism, the Federal
Reserve could more directly establish a floor for the federal funds rate (as noted below in a
Board of Governors press release (Board of Governors 2008)).
“The payment of interest on excess reserve balances will give the Federal Reserve greater
scope to use its lending programs to address conditions in credit markets while also maintaining
the Federal funds rate close to the target established by the Federal Open Market Committee.”
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The agent-based model can be used to evaluate such policies, including re-creating any
historic scenarios and testing alternatives never implemented in practice. For example, we plan
to experiment with this IOER mechanism by running simulations at a variety of interest rate
levels.
4.8

Simulating Policy Effects

One of the overall goals of this work is to add agent-based modeling and simulation to our
toolkit for evaluating financial regulatory policy. The role of the Federal Reserve and central
banks around the world has been at the forefront of the response to the most recent financial
crisis. The policies pursued by these institutions have been largely unprecedented in both method
and scope. Can agent-based modeling and simulation capture some of the complex dynamics and
usefully play out possible scenarios?
As a first application, simulations were run based on the high-level forces, including
fiscal policy, monetary policy, foreign central bank reserve management and the actions of the
non-banking private sector. The policies reflect a combination of publicly declared plans from
the US Treasury and Federal Reserve (as these entities strive to be somewhat transparent), along
with various industry analyses and some questions open for debate. The core accounts and
starting balances for the simulation are shown earlier. Many of these accounts appear on more
than one agent balance sheet (held as assets or liabilities).
The policy parameters define the policy being evaluated, specifying some of the key
behaviors that many other agents must respond to as the simulation unfolds. The US Treasury
(TSY) agent drives fiscal policy by implementing debt financing (as first determined by
government spending). The monthly deficit is assumed to be $7,500,000,000 throughout the
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simulation. In addition, the target for the Treasury General Account (TGA) is set to
$500,000,000,000 (from a starting value of $93,893,000,000).
Of course, the Fed is a key agent in this model, driving monetary policy. As part of the
balance sheet unwind, the Fed has set a runoff schedule for its System Open Market Account
(SOMA) US Treasuries holdings (see https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating
policy 170920) with monthly runoffs between $6 and $30 billion for 2017-2018. The schedule is
read into the FED agent and converted into daily (tick-by-tick) runoff amounts. The same
schedule also specifies the Fed SOMA mortgage-backed securities (MBS) holdings, giving rise
to an additional runoff stream. The Reverse “Repo” Program (RRP) has a target of
$10,000,000,000 (from a starting value of $200,000,000,000) and a horizon of 40 ticks. Finally,
the currency in circulation (CCY) is assumed to grow at 7%.
For this first simulation, the participation of foreign central banks (FCB) is held relatively
constant with a growth rate of 5% for US Treasuries holdings and cash. Of course, the behavior
of foreign central banks, especially the largest, is one of the areas of speculation. This is fodder
for further simulations and perhaps another fine-grained expansion of the model with agents for
at least the most influential of the foreign central banks.
The remaining flows relate to the actions taken by the banking sector (BKS) and nonbanking private sector (NBS) in the model. The question here is which sector will pick up the
slack in purchasing newly issued US Treasuries. For now, the sectors shares are 10% for the
banking sector and 90% for the non-banking sector. All of these parameters reflect the policies
adopted by agencies such as the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, as well as key behavioral
assumptions that can be modified in subsequent simulations.
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Figure 1Figure 19 summarizes the results of simulations using the parameters discussed
above by showing selected balance sheet items for key agents over time (or ticks). Considering
the panels in turn, the end-of-day account balances for agent Bks0 (upper left) shows the overall
decline in deposits (held by non-banking private sector entities) This follows from the fact that
non-banking firms are buying up US Treasuries and therefore withdrawing the funds to make
those purchases. Also notice that the banking sector (BKS) reserves briefly rise and then begin a
long decline. Given the Fed unwind, this decline in banking sector reserves is expected, but it is
the pace of this decline that is of interest as a simulation result. Finally, notice the decline in the
Reverse “Repo” Program (RRP), causing the temporary upward move in the banking reserves.
The non-banking sector (lower left) highlights the decline in NBS deposits and upward
move in US Treasury holdings as new issues are purchased. The RRP account also appears on
this balance sheet. The foreign central bank combined balance sheet (upper right) shows the
relatively stable (albeit slowly rising) US Treasury and cash holdings. Again, this is an
interesting area for future work.
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Figure 19: Agent balance sheet changes over time as FED pursues runoff policies

Finally, the US Treasury balance sheet (lower right) shows all of the agent holdings, with a rise
in the non-banking sector holdings (due to new issue purchases) and a decline in the Fed
holdings from planned portfolio runoffs. There is also a consistent rise in the US Treasury
General Account (TGA) as certain banking reserves leave the system. Overall, the simulation
seems to capture the major flow of funds in this complex market ecosystem.
Figure 20 shows a more detailed view of the Fed agent balance sheet (using a reduced yaxis scale of $5 trillion). This highlights the important balance sheet changes, including the
reduction in the Fed’s US Treasuries holdings as per the planned runoff. One of the most
important simulation results is the decrease in banking sector (BKS) reserves. It is this critical
account that is likely to cause stress to appear in the banking sector as reserves become scarce.
The drop here is not too severe with banking reserves rising at the outset, but then dipping below
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$2 trillion. However, it is important to note that this is basically a one-year simulation (252 ticks)
and the runoff schedule starts somewhat gently becoming much larger toward the end of the
year. The brief rise in the banking reserves is due to the initial runoff in the Reverse “Repo”
Program (over the first two months), see the initial drop in Figure 20 for NBS RRP.

Figure 20: The Fed0 agent balance sheet changes as runoff policies are pursued

This is a first simulation that looks at the effects of major policy directions from the US
Treasury and Federal Reserve over a one-year period. The initial results of this ensemble agentbased approach are promising, but subsequent steps should improve the simulations. These next
steps include defining more detailed foreign central bank agents and simulating a variety of
scenarios.

69

4.9

Conclusion

The use of agent-based simulation holds great potential for regulators and monetary authorities
looking to assess potential instabilities in financial markets and analyze the effectiveness of crisis
responses. Existing methods of analysis either directly or indirectly rely on observations drawn
from the past and their track record is somewhat lackluster when dealing with phenomena that do
not have historical data. The past decade of unparalleled global monetary stimulus contributed to
a financial environment that is without precedent and—in the eyes of many participants—
severely distorted Jacobs and King (2016).
It is in this “new financial normal” that the gradual exit from accommodative monetary
policy (which—in the US—started at the end of 2017) will proceed. While regulators signal their
intent to have the process run quietly in the background, some practitioners and academics fear
that the exit may prove turbulent. A 2015 research note from Credit Suisse Pozsar (2014)
highlights the unprecedented nature of the unwind as stated below.
“First, the Fed will raise interest rates using new tools. Second, the money flows that
liftoff will generate, both on and offshore, will dwarf those involved in past hiking cycles. Third,
liftoff will occur in a financial environment completely redesigned through Basel III: bank
balance sheets are now subject to liquidity and funding rules that have never been stress-tested in
a hiking cycle before. No matter how transparent the Fed has been about the start and pace of
liftoff, the combination of new tools and a redesigned financial system may cause turbulence in
money, FX and Treasury markets on purely ‘mechanical’ grounds.”
It is important to note that the trajectory and outcome of the monetary policy unwind
depend on the actions of market participants. As the Fed raises rates and unwinds its balance
sheet, investors will likely re-balance portfolios while banks strategically respond to the liquidity
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risk implications of reserve draining. We believe that agent-based simulations can provide
valuable insight into the mechanics and outcome of the unwind. Simulations allow the analysis
of likely outcomes for a wide range of scenarios, using simple behavioral assumptions across the
ecology of market participants.
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CHAPTER 5. APPLICATION OF ABM FOR BANK RESERVE DYNAMICS
Research in the domain of Financial Contagion has come to the forefront in recent years. There
has been a significant focus on this field since the recession of 2008. In this study we take a look
at simulation-based modelling to stress test the stability of inter-bank loan networks of different
structures. We look to analyze the effect of various parameters on the stability of these networks.
We first simulate networks which are Homogeneous in nature. We then simulate a
Heterogeneous (tiered) network. The model also introduces an endogenous loaning mechanism
to imitate a more realistic inter bank loan market. We run simulations on these networks to gain a
better understanding of the propagation of losses through the network. After studying the results
of these simulations, we come up with some interesting new insights about how parameters like
connectivity and size of the network, effect a tiered intra-bank financial network. One of our key
findings is that higher inter-tier connectivity is good for the stability of big banks but not so
much for banks of smaller size.
5.1

Introduction

The recent global recession of 2008 was a global disaster. It led to losses in the home equity
network that transpired to huge losses being incurred in the stock network. According to
Business Insider, the United States of America lost more than 10 Trillion dollars in the crash
(Carney 2016). According to The Guardian, the crash in network also led to more than 500 banks
declaring bankruptcy and a considerably higher number of banks suffered considerable losses, in
the subsequent years (DataBlog 2016). Modern day financial institutions are interlinked between
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each other. The failure of one institution affects the financial health of others. This is depicted by
common “Too Big to Fail” phrase (Onaran 2016) which indicates there are certain big financial
institutions that can’t be allowed to fail. The failure of these banks will lead to catastrophic
failure of the overall financial systems. However, though there is an agreement that there are few
banks that are too large and too risky to fail, there has not been much research or study on how
big is too big. There is scant understanding of the impact of various characteristics of financial
networks that may affect the stability of the network. In light of this tragedy, the study of
systemic risk in financial Networks has come to the forefront of research. Acemoglu (Acemoglu
et al 2013) have studied this aspect through an analytical way. They have mathematically
modeled the financial network and have identified several properties and characteristics for
stability of the financial network.
Though mathematical modeling is important for deriving theoretical insights, it is limited
by the assumptions that are needed to make a mathematical model fit to a real-life scenario. To
address more realistic situation, in this study we use simulation-based network modeling to
identify scenarios where failure of one or few banks can lead to failure of the overall system.
Through simulation-based approach we determine, how Failure of one individual bank in a
financial network can cause a cascade of failures throughout the system. We take a network
model approach (Dasgupta et al 2012, Upper 2011, Acemoglu et al 2013, Haldane et al. 2011,
Nier et al 2007) to do this simulation. In this research we focus on the financial sector,
specifically interbank loan networks.
First, we simulate the interbank loan network through a simulation of a network of nodes.
Next, to do stress test of the network, we simulate shocks which can assess the stability of the
network based on certain parameters. A concept known as contagion is introduced which affects
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the whole network of nodes, instead of just one bank. The banks have dependencies on the other
banks when they either borrow money or lend money to other banks. Such cases are also handled
in this model of banking. Let us consider an example of a bank which goes bankrupt and crossed
the limits of capital. The loans it has got have exceeded the limits and it cannot repay the loan
amount now. In such cases, the lending banks would be losing the money and their net capital
(assets) should be updated accordingly. If a bank’s asset becomes lower than its liabilities, we
say it has defaulted and remove it from the network. However, removal of one bank from the
financial system leads to loss of the loan given to the removed bank by all other banks in the
system. This leads to propagation of financial loss through the network and may lead to failure
(or removal) of more banks from the system. As the number of banks failing due to such a
domino effect increases, more unstable the financial network becomes.
In this research we investigate the stability of this interbank loan network against certain
parameters – number of banks, their internal connectivity and the severity of a shock. We
measure the stability by the metric of how many nodes and how much residual capital survives in
the aftermath of the shock. We also analyze a tiered banking network structure with an
endogenous loaning mechanism, where the decision of granting an interbank loan is not random
but is based on risk and return of the loan.
This research is fundamental to the kind of research being sought after by Central Banks
around the world (Georg 2011, Glasserman et al 2015). At the junction of financial crisis, the
output of this research can be used by central banks to determine when and how to intervene. For
example, whether the central bank should let a bank fail or should it intervene – this question has
wide political and economic implications. However, seldom that decision is driven by evidencebased research. This research aims to close that particular gap.
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Some of the specific contributions of this study are to run simulations on tiered networks
resembling the real world inter bank loan markets and see how connectivity and size of the
network along with the intensity of the shocking mechanism effect the stability of such a tiered
structure. We analyze in detail the effect of such parameters on each individual tier of the said
banking network.
The rest of the study is organized as follows in section 2 we discuss the related work
consisting of past research in this domain. In section 3, we present the model and provide
definition of key terminologies that have been used in the study, we also present the dataset that
we use to initiate our model. Here we also the key design principles used while designing the
agent-based model. In section 4, we discuss about the metrics used and analyze the results
achieved after running simulations. This is followed by conclusions.
5.2

Related Work

The way we look at the problem is very similar to the way a disease spreads through a population
where the infection can be transmitted from one person to another upon contact (Langmuir 1980,
Jacquez et al 1991). This is where the name contagion is derived from. This approach of
determining the stability of a network or propagation of a shock has been studied in various other
disciplines like Biology (Langmuir 1980, Jacquez et al 1991), Economics (Kaminsky et al 2000,
Allen et al 2000), Psychology (Hatfield et al 1993) and Sociology (Burt 1987) among many
others.
Even though the interest in contagion has seen significant spike in recent years due to the
global crisis, it is not a new topic, Diamond (Diamond et al 1983) came up with a model for bank
runs and related financial crises way back in 1983. There was also considerable research done in
the field after the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994 and the Asian Network crash of 1997 (Sachs et al
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1996, Wade et al 1999). However, the domain really came to the forefront with the influential
study by Allen (Allen et al 2000) where they analyzed the fragility of a given network system
based on its structure by making use of simple examples. There has been a lot of theoretical
research done in the study of contagion (Haldane et al. 2011, Nier et al 2007, Boss 2004,
Battiston et al 2012, Cont et al 2010, Markose et al 2012, Haldane 2013), but there is a lack of
empirical research. This lack of empirical research has been a problem for central banks and
regulators. Many central banks around the world have conducted research that looks to address
this issue (Cont et al 2010, Georg 2011, Glasserman et al 2015). However, as the data required
for this kind of research is proprietary in nature, research outside of institutions with available
data, need to resort to simulations. This has led to the use of simulations to study the effect
stability of network of financial institutions in case of instability of one or few banks in the
network.
Nier et al (Nier 2007) were one of the first to use simulation methods to analyze the
interbank loan networks. This work, in turn, has greatly inspired a lot of further research in this
domain. The use of Eboli model which equates the default dynamics of the interbank loan
networks to flow networks in physics, led to this work being emulated and improved on further
by multiple studys. One such study being Dasgupta (Dasgupta et al 2012) who use simulations to
come up with a contagion index combining various characteristics of similar network models as
of (Nier 2007). Upper (Upper 2011) in 2011 used simulations to validate the results and compare
the various models used by different studys; this study showcases how simulations can be used
to visualize the loan networks as networks or graphs and how it can be a powerful tool for
analyzing interbank loan networks.
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However, most of these simulations have been run on Homogeneous networks, networks
where all nodes and edges are of equal importance/strength. There have been few studies with a
two-tiered network structure (Dasgupta et al 2012, Upper 2011, Nier et al 2007, Boss 2004,
Battiston et al 2012, Markose et al 2012), where nodes are identical to nodes in its own tier but
differ from nodes of the other layer. Also, the edge weights vary leading to this structure being
very different from the Homogeneous one. Many have argued that even though the results
achieved in a homogeneous network may work in an ideal world, the complexity of the realworld problems can be represented by adding Heterogeneity to the said networks. So, (Dasgupta
et al 2012) and (Nier et al 2007) delve into heterogeneity by running simulations on a two-tiered
alpha-beta heterogeneous network, (Battiston et al 2012) investigates the existence of dense
cores in a heterogeneous network of banks. In this study we extend this work by running
simulations on a three-tiered structure, with heterogeneity among nodes in each layer. We
emulate a real work bank lending network by introducing a third tier which shall resemble the
sector specific financial institutions (such as mutual fund or other financial derivatives of various
sectors). Here the tier 1 bank is the ‘Big’ banks, so they will have a considerably large amount of
assets whereas second tier banks will be relatively smaller in size. The tier 3 will refer to sectors
and they represent a collection of loanees pertaining to specific domains. For example, Real
Estate can be regarded as a sector. None of the banks will be identical to each other. We first
validate the results achieved for Homogeneous structures and compare them to results obtained
by (Dasgupta et al 2012, Upper 2011, Nier et al 2007). We then show that similar relationships
can be observed for a more complex three-tiered structure as well and derive few more useful
insights.

77

5.3

Model Components: FED and BNK

As presented in the previous chapter the hierarchical model of the Fed Funds market has two
layers: first is the coarse-grained flow of funds model called FED and second is the fine-grained
inter-bank lending market model called BNK. The FED model comprises of five representative
agents who are the major participants of the Federal Reserve system. These agents are the
Federal Reserve, US Treasury, banking sector, the non-banking public sector and GSEs and
foreign central banks. The different representative agents are interconnected with each other
using a set of shared accounts.

Figure 21: FED agent interactions implemented through shared accounts
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As presented in Figure 21, the shared accounts between the different agents make FED a
novel flow of funds model. Hence, when the Federal Reserve has its treasury notes mature, it lets
them roll off and lets either the banking or the non-banking public sector purchases these
treasury notes. Given the setup in Figure 21, we can see that the Federal Reserve shares the
banking reserves account with the banking sector, and the Non-banking sector RRP account with
the public. The public and the banking sector share the non-banking sector or public deposits
between each other and have shared respective treasury accounts with the US Treasury. This
flow of funds mechanism helps us to validate the model quite effectively using the mechanics of
Fed unwind among market participants.
The BNK model, on the other hand is much more fine-grained and its components
represent individual banks which are part of the US Banking system. So, it is an extension of the
banking sector of the FED model. Applying clustering to historic call reports data reporting the
balance sheets of individual banks, we identify their various lending characteristics. These
characteristics help us identify behavior patterns of each individual bank in the system and
establish inter-bank communication patterns Modeling these relationships, and using different
monetary policy constraints we validate the BNK sub-model. Tying up the BNK with the FED
model, we create the hierarchical model for the Fed Funds market. We use data set published by
Drechsler (Drechsler et al. 2017) which captures different aspects reported by them as call
reports to load our agent’s behavior. We present a snapshot of the segment of what the data looks
like in Table 18. We employ cluster analysis based on certain characteristics of this data to
extract lending models of various banks. Once the cluster analysis is performed we extract banks
from the various clusters and extract some more information from the FFIEC data source to
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create a customized dataset, which is presented in Table 19, which we would use to validate and
test out our model. Once the data is loaded we initiate our agent-based model environment, and
initially instantiate the agents and their various characteristics using call report data. The decision
rules of the model are dependent on different policy constraints and include ratios like the cash to
asset ratio, liquidity coverage ratio among others. The communication mechanism between how
different agents or banks dictate how they will interact with each other. Currently we are
employing a very simple communication mechanism where different banks, who need loans will
apply by broadcasting their request and one of the other banks, who have excess reserves, will be
randomly chosen to meet the call. In future, we plan to implement and use preferential
attachment to the communication mechanism where we build lending relationships between
particular banks and their association will get stronger as the simulation ticks go forward. Each
simulation tick represents a trading day in our system, and for starters we use a smaller subset of
the total number banks available in the system for validation and testing. We validate the model
using policy constraints used during the financial crisis of 2008, and will use the policies of
Quantitative Easing and Tightening as the baseline, to validate if agents in the BNK model
perform similar to banks in real life or not.
Table 18: Snapshot of call report data used for clustering
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Table 19: Customized data set for calculating high quality liquid assets (HQLA)
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5.4

Model Validation: FED and BNK

The FED model is validated using the mechanics of the FED unwind among market participants
as demonstrated in Figure 22. Here, as presented in Figure 21, we can see the Fed rolls off its
maturing treasuries, there are two scenarios which we can use to validate our model. In scenario
1, we assume it is the banking sector that steps in that leads to a reduction of banking reserves
held at the Federal Reserve by the banks. This leads to a removal of Treasury proceeds from the
balance sheet of the Fed as well as reduces the amount of excess reserves. In scenario 2, we
assume it is the public sector that steps in to purchases the maturing Treasury holdings that the
Fed is trying to roll off. This will lead to the public buying the treasury holdings using the
deposits that they have kept with the banking sector. So, we should see a reduction in the
deposits and an increase in the Treasury holdings within the balance sheet of the Public sector,
which in turn will lead to a reduction of Treasury holdings in the balance sheet of the FED and a
reduction in the balance sheet of the banking sector. To counter balance these reductions the
banking sector will reduce the excess reserves that they hold with the Federal reserve, leading to
an equivalent amount of reduction in said aspects of their balance sheets. These scenarios are
captured perfectly with our flow of funds FED model and when we implement said scenarios it is
reflected within the balance sheets of said agents, as demonstrated by Figure 15 and Figure 16
showcased in the previous chapter.
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Figure 22: Mechanics of Fed unwind among agents using Treasury holdings.

Validation of the BNK model was done using past policies and the subsequent change in
behavior of banks. Financial crisis provides an especially compelling natural experiment that can
be used for the same. Quantitative easing was implemented after the crisis hit, and as banking
reserves grew until the system was awash in money, borrowing made little sense as way for a
bank to meet reserve requirements, so overnight lending ceased. Similarly, post crisis the Federal
reserve enacted Quantitative tightening, which led to enough lowering of banking reserves to
make the liquidity constraints binding enough for the lending to resume. These natural
experiments provided the ideal backdrop for validating our model. We run the validation
simulation using 100 of the largest banks in the US banking system and apply policy for bank
reserve constraints (similar to Quantitative tightening and easing) and run the simulation for 50
ticks. The results are demonstrated in the previous chapter Figure 17 and Figure 18.
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5.5

Application of the Hierarchical Model

Once both the FED and BNK models are validated, they can be used individually to run natural
experiments as demonstrated in section 4.8 on page 65. Integrating these two models, we arrive
at the hierarchical model which combines the coarse-grained flow of funds model with the finegrained interbank loans market. Using the customized data presented in Table 19, created using
sources from FFIEC, Drechsler and the cluster analysis we performed, the data combines
multiple aspects if call report data and grants banks membership according to their lending
practices. We use call report data from the last quarter of 2013, and the cluster analysis shows
that there are only three different lending business models amongst banks. We select top 10
banks from each of these clusters (based on their total assets), and assign cluster designations
accordingly. Cluster 1 or C1 represents banks with a sole concentration in real estate lending; C2
represents banks with a concentration in Real Estate and Commercial and Industrial lending
whereas C3 consists of banks whose major focus is on agricultural lending along with real estate
lending. The data also consists of other banking aspects which we enlist here:
The bank’s rssid, bank’s name, total assets, amount of cash the bank has at its disposal,
equity, total amount of loans, securities, total liabilities, total deposits that the bank has, The
regulatory capital ratio that the bank reports for that quarter, The return on equity for the quarter,
excess reserves held by the bank, the total amount of treasury securities held by the bank, the
bank’s total non-government sponsored bonds, the total amount of mortgage backed securities
held by the bank along with the cluster group they belong to among others.
These parameters are captured so as to ensure that we are able to calculate policy
constraints like liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). The attributes captured are used to calculate the
numerator of the LCR, which is also referred to as high quality liquidity assets (HQLA) (Hong et
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al 2014). Once we have policy constraints like LCR calculated for the banks, we are able to
analyze how Fed runoffs may impact the individual banks and their respective interactions. To
observe the impact on banks, we have created a parameter which keeps track of how much stress,
each individual bank is currently under. This is extremely critical and rather than looking at the
impact at an individual bank’s level, we abstract the results to look at the average stress level
within banks belonging to the clusters. So, for example for a policy change initiated by the Fed,
we see how that affects individual bank balance sheets but will plot out the results according to
how banks within a cluster get impacted. In this study we test out two particular constraints as
case studies and see how they impact the respective banks.
5.5.1 Cash to Asset Ratio (CAR)
In this case study we observe the effect of Fed runoff on banks’ balance sheet and consequently
on their stress levels. We observe that as cash outflows begin to occur for banks in the system,
they start getting more stressed. In this particular case study if the Fed determines that the banks
need to have a decreasing CAR, that means that banks would need to get rid of more of their
reserves and buy treasuries, which will help the Fed to reduce their balance sheet, but we see
signs of stress percolate within the system. As demonstrated by Figure 23, we observe that at tick
0, the C1 and C2 both have zero stress but C3, which are relatively smaller banks already have 4
out of 10 banks demonstrating stress. As the ticks go on we observe that all members of the C3
cluster are under considerable stress within a month. For member banks of C2, the rise in stress
is a bit more delayed and by the end of simulation, nearly five months from the onset, 9 out of 10
banks are demonstrating to be under stress. Members of C3 are much more resilient to stress
though and even by the end of the simulation, 6 of the 10 members, are demonstrating to be
under stress. Increasing bank stress in a clear sign that policy normalization may need to be
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paused, otherwise we may start seeing some of these banks begin to fail to meet the
requirements.

Figure 23: Bank stress levels using cash to asset ratio

5.5.2 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
In the second case study, we again check how the Fed runoffs may affect the banks’ stress levels,
but based on the policy constraint of liquidity coverage ratio. We calculate LCR in two parts.
The numerator is the amount of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA), which is calculated using the
attributes from our customized dataset. The denominator is the total amount of projected cash
outflows for the bank in the next 30 days. To arrive at the denominator, we make use of our
simulation to get the cash outflows in the last 10 days, using a weighted average approach we use
it to arrive at the amount of cash outflows the bank will have at the end of the next 30 days. Once
both the numerator and denominator are calculated, we now can calculate the LCR for the
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individual banks. For the purpose of this simulation the LCR constraint required by the Fed from
each individual bank is set to 0.5.
Similar to case study 1, we observe the effect of Fed runoffs on individual banks’ balance
sheet data and aggregate their stress levels according to the clusters. Our findings are presented
in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Bank stress levels using liquidity coverage ratio

As can be observed, as cash outflows occur, it leads to banks from cluster 3 and cluster 2 to
come under stress. Cluster 1 banks demonstrate that an LCR of 0.5 does not cause even a single
bank of the group to demonstrate stress. For cluster 2, the number of banks demonstrating stress
rises from 1 to 4 around the three-month period and at the end of the simulation the number of
banks demonstrating stress, from cluster 2 are 6. Some cluster 3 banks on the other hand
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demonstrate stress right from the beginning and by the end of the third month of simulation all
banks of this cluster are again under stress. So this case study again showcases that policies
constrained have to be fine-tuned at a cluster level, otherwise what may not be significant for
banks of a certain size and pertaining to a particular business model, but can be disastrous for
banks belonging to another.
5.6

Conclusion

The novel hierarchical model of the Federal Reserve system, provides an alternative to
traditional economic models. The coarse-grained flow of funds model is developed based on
interlocking balance sheets, akin to the concept of shared accounts. The model is validated using
documented balance sheet effects and is then used to run experiments based on actual real-life
Fed run-off plans. The dissertation also develops a fine-grained bank model using the individual
banks’ balance sheet data. We run a cluster analysis to get a better understand the landscape of
the banking systems and the respective heterogeneity of banking business models amongst the
federally regulated banks in the United States. We then use the understanding gathered from this
exercise to inform our agents’ behavior in the model. It is critical to understand how different
banks lend to each other and how they are affected by past policies for the model to work
effectively. The model thus built, is validated using natural scenarios that took place when the
Federal Reserve embarked upon Quantitative Easing in 2007 and Quantitative Tightening in
2015. The interbank loan market is then integrated with the Federal Reserve model, to arrive at
the hierarchical model, which is then used to run experiments assessing the effects of Fed runoff
policies based on bank stress parameters like cash to asset ratio and Liquidity coverage ratio.
The implications of this research are also quite significant. The cluster analysis enables us
to observe a longitudinal evolution of banking practices of federally regulated banks enabling us
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to get a deeper understanding of how different aspects of banking have evolved over the years.
Agent-based models hold great potential for regulators and monetary authorities looking to
assess potential instabilities in financial markets and analyze the effectiveness of crisis responses
and look towards granular approaches. The hierarchical model presented is not only capable of
proactively evaluating monetary policies but also capable of providing policy alternatives. As for
future work, The cluster analysis is being extended to not only include the different kinds of
loans made by banks, but to include different constraints like Regulatory Capital Ratio, Loans to
Asset Ratio to provide a more wholesome understanding of the banks' lending behavior. The
communication mechanism within the ABM for Fed-Funds markets is being modified to include
preferential attachment to make it more robust.
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CHAPTER 6. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter presents the contributions and limitations of the dissertation research along with
presenting future research that can be conducted using this dissertation as a platform. We present
the various application areas that the dissertation can contribute to along with some discussion
about other application domains which can be contributed using the methodology employed in
the current research. We also enlist some of the shortcomings of the current work and present
how we are looking to address the issues and how these future modifications can help improve
not only the efficacy of the model but also broaden its application area.
The contribution of this dissertation is multi-fold. Firstly, the cluster analysis performed
explores how the landscape of federally regulate banks have changed over the years. Secondly,
the dissertation presents artifacts in the form of two models for the financial markets. The first
one is the flow of funds model for the coarse-grained Fed Funds market and the second one is the
agent-based model of the inter-bank lending market. The two models use simulation to not only
evaluate monetary policies but also present a platform that can be used to proactively evaluate
future monetary policies.
In the dissertation presented here, we present how an agent-based modelling approach
can be employed to model financial markets. A sectoral (aggregate) flow of funds model (FED)
explores the speed with which banking reserves are expected to decline, based on the Fed’s
communicated SOMA portfolio unwind plan and using basic portfolio assumptions across all
sectoral agents (including the US Treasury, GSEs and foreign central banks). The sectoral flow
of funds model is combined with a granular agent-based model of the US banking sector (BNK)
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in order to analyze the impact of the decline in reserves on banks. The granular bank model
implements basic actions (and constraints) for banks and non-bank private sector agents and
focuses on the emergence of stress triggered by liquidity constraints and signaled through
interbank lending activity (Fed Funds market). We use regulatory balance sheet data to model
the many types of banks and associated business models that influence decision making.
Using balance sheet data from historical call reports, we build a hierarchical Fed funds
model. We make use of 40 years of the historical call reports to extract different kinds of bank
lending models and using cluster analysis, divide the banks within clusters. Having clusters of
the banks over the years enables us to not only check the evolution of lending models but also
enables us to test out different characteristics of said clusters. These characteristics help us to get
a better understanding of the agent landscape and environment. It also informs us about how
different banks interact with each other as well as different domains, which helps us in modeling
their agent behavior. Once the communication mechanism has been created then we initiate our
bank agents using the call report data from a fixed point of time and use federally disclosed
policy constraints like bank reserve tightening as decision rules to validate our model. We also
use other policy constraints like the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to evaluate our model and
provide policy alternatives based on the simulations.
The cluster analysis work enables us to observe a longitudinal evolution of banking
practices of federally regulated banks within the United States. The focus of this dissertation has
been on the evolving lending practices of regulated banks, but given the dataset consists of more
aspects of banking, the method can be extended to include or focus on other aspects to extract
historical clusters of banks according to the focus. This can enable researchers to get a deeper
understanding of how different aspects of banking have evolved over the years.
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Characterizing banking business models is part of a larger research initiative focusing on
agent-based modeling and simulation. A coarse-grained model of the Federal funds market aims
to better understand the overall effects as the Federal Reserve pursues monetary policy
normalization. A more fine-grained model of the inter-bank lending market focuses on
highlighting how stress might appear in the banking sector as quantitative tightening escalates.
Understanding banking business models is key to building better agent-based models, especially
the fine-grained banking model. The agents can be instantiated using realistic balance sheet data
(from any given snapshot) but understanding the business model contributes directly to better
behavioral implementations. Finally, interpreting simulation results is made easier when able to
group banks by business models and clarify patterns. Unsupervised learning methods such as
cluster analysis seem like a natural fit for this business model discovery challenge given the
promising results achieved to date.
The use of agent-based simulation holds great potential for regulators and monetary
authorities looking to assess potential instabilities in financial markets and analyze the
effectiveness of crisis responses. Existing methods of analysis either directly or indirectly rely on
observations drawn from the past and their track record is somewhat lackluster when dealing
with phenomena that do not have historical data. The past decade of unparalleled global
monetary stimulus contributed to a financial environment that is without precedent and—in the
eyes of many participants—severely distorted Jacobs and King (2016).
It is in this “new financial normal” that the gradual exit from accommodative monetary
policy (which—in the US—started at the end of 2017) will proceed. While regulators signal their
intent to have the process run quietly in the background, some practitioners and academics fear
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that the exit may prove turbulent. A 2015 research note from Credit Suisse Pozsar (2014)
highlights the unprecedented nature of the unwind as stated below.
“First, the Fed will raise interest rates using new tools. Second, the money flows that
liftoff will generate, both on and offshore, will dwarf those involved in past hiking cycles. Third,
liftoff will occur in a financial environment completely redesigned through Basel III: bank
balance sheets are now subject to liquidity and funding rules that have never been stress-tested in
a hiking cycle before. No matter how transparent the Fed has been about the start and pace of
liftoff, the combination of new tools and a redesigned financial system may cause turbulence in
money, FX and Treasury markets on purely ‘mechanical’ grounds.”
It is important to note that the trajectory and outcome of the monetary policy unwind
depend on the actions of market participants. As the Fed raises rates and unwinds its balance
sheet, investors will likely re-balance portfolios while banks strategically respond to the liquidity
risk implications of reserve draining. We believe that agent-based simulations can provide
valuable insight into the mechanics and outcome of the unwind. Simulations allow the analysis
of likely outcomes for a wide range of scenarios, using simple behavioral assumptions across the
ecology of market participants.
In conclusion, the novel hierarchical model of the Federal Reserve system, provides an
alternative to traditional economic models. The coarse-grained flow of funds model is developed
based on interlocking balance sheets, akin to the concept of shared accounts. The model is
validated using documented balance sheet effects and is then used to run experiments based on
actual real-life Fed run-off plans. The dissertation also develops a fine-grained bank model using
the individual banks’ balance sheet data. We run a cluster analysis to get a better understand the
landscape of the banking systems and the respective heterogeneity of banking business models
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amongst the federally regulated banks in the United States. We then use the understanding
gathered from this exercise to inform our agents’ behavior in the model. It is critical to
understand how different banks lend to each other and how they are affected by past policies for
the model to work effectively. The model thus built, is validated using natural scenarios that took
place when the Federal Reserve embarked upon Quantitative Easing in 2007 and Quantitative
Tightening in 2015. The interbank loan market is then integrated with the Federal Reserve
model, to arrive at the hierarchical model, which is then used to run experiments assessing the
effects of Fed runoff policies based on bank stress parameters like cash to asset ratio and
Liquidity coverage ratio.
The implications of this research are also quite significant. The cluster analysis enables us
to observe a longitudinal evolution of banking practices of federally regulated banks enabling us
to get a deeper understanding of how different aspects of banking have evolved over the years.
Agent-based models hold great potential for regulators and monetary authorities looking to
assess potential instabilities in financial markets and analyze the effectiveness of crisis responses
and look towards granular approaches. The hierarchical model presented is not only capable of
proactively evaluating monetary policies but also capable of providing policy alternatives. As for
future work, The cluster analysis is being extended to not only include the different kinds of
loans made by banks, but to include different constraints like Regulatory Capital Ratio, Loans to
Asset Ratio to provide a more wholesome understanding of the banks' lending behavior. The
communication mechanism within the ABM for Fed-Funds markets is being modified to include
preferential attachment to make it more robust.

94

REFERENCES
Ayadi, R. (2016). Bank Business Models in Europe: Why Does it Matter for the Future of
Regulation and Resolution? International Research Centre on Cooperative Finance
Policy Paper Jul.
Ayadi, R., De Groen, W., Sassi, I., Mathlouthi, W., Rey, H., & Aubry, O. (2016). Banking
business models monitor 2015 Europe. Available at SSRN 2784334.
Bernanke, B. S. (2017). Monetary policy in a new era.
Bernanke, B. (2016). The relationship between stocks and oil prices. Ben Bernanke’s Blog on
Brookings posted on February, 19(2016).
Blavarg M, Nimander P. 2002. “Interbank exposures and systemic risk,” Risk Measurement and
Systemic Risk-Proceedings of the Third Joint Central Bank Research Conference (Basel,
Bank for International Settlements), 287–305 Citeseer.
Boss M, Elsinger H, Summer M, Thurner 4 S. 2004. “Network topology of the interbank
market”. Quantitative finance 4(6):677–684.
Brissimis, S. N., & Delis, M. D. (2010). Bank heterogeneity and monetary policy transmission.
Berndt, D. J., Boogers, D., Chakraborty, S., & Cabre, C. (2019, July). Using agent-based
modeling to assess the implications of changing liquidity conditions. In Proceedings of
the 2019 Summer Simulation Conference (p. 29). Society for Computer Simulation
International.

95

Berndt, D. J., Boogers, D., Chakraborty, S., & McCart, J. (2019). Using agent-based modeling to
assess liquidity mismatch in open-end bond funds. In Summer of Simulation (pp. 219245). Springer, Cham.
Berndt, D. J., Boogers, D., Chakraborty, S., & McCart, J. (2017). Using Agent-Based Modeling
to Assess Liquidity Mismatch in Open-End Bond Funds. Systems, 5(4), 54.
Chakraborty, S., Gaeta, J., Dutta, K., & Berndt, D. (2017, January). An Analysis of Stability of
Inter-bank Loan Network: A Simulated Network Approach. In Proceedings of the 50th
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.
Cont, R., & Moussa, A. (2010). Network structure and systemic risk in banking systems. Edson
Bastos e, Network Structure and Systemic Risk in Banking Systems (December 1,
2010).
Dardac, N., & Boitan, I. A. (2009). A Cluster Analysis Approach for Banks' Risk Profile: The
Romanian Evidence. European Research Studies, 12(1), 109.
Drechsler, I., Savov, A., & Schnabl, P. (2017). The deposits channel of monetary policy. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4), 1819-1876.
Farmer JD, Foley D. (2009). The economy needs agent-based modelling. Nature 460:685–686.
Furfine CH. (2003). Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion. Journal of money,
credit and banking 111–128.
Hakrama I, Frasheri N. (2018). Agent-based modeling and simulation of an artificial economy
with repast. International Journal on Information Technologies & Security 4(2).
Haldane AG, May RM. (2011). Systemic risk in banking ecosystems. Nature 469(7330):351.
Hryckiewicz, A., & Kozłowski, Ł. (2017). Banking business models and the nature of financial
crisis, Journal of International Money and Finance, 71, 1-24.

96

Krichene H, El-Aroui MA. (2018). Agent-based simulation and microstructure modeling of
immature stock markets. Computational Economics 51(3):493–511.
MacLeod, M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2013). Building simulations from the ground up: Modeling
and theory in systems biology. Philosophy of science, 80(4), 533-556.
Mergaerts, F., & Vander Vennet, R. (2016). Business models and bank performance: A longterm perspective, Journal of Financial Stability, 22, 57-75.
Markose S, Giansante S, Shaghaghi AR. (2012). Too interconnected to fail. Financial network of
US cds market: Topological fragility and systemic risk. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 83(3):627–646.
Nier E, Yang J, Yorulmazer T, Alentorn A. (2008). Network models and financial stability. Bank
of England Working paper series.
Nyman, R., Kapadia, S., Tuckett, D., Gregory, D., Ormerod, P., & Smith, R. (2018). News and
narratives in financial systems: exploiting big data for systemic risk assessment.
Stowe, D. L., & Stowe, J. D. (2018). Credit union business models, Financial Markets,
Institutions & Instruments, 27(5), 169-186.
Upper C. (2011). Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets,
Journal of Financial Stability. 7(3):111–125.
Afonso G, Lagos R. (2015). Trade dynamics in the market for federal funds. Econometrica
83(1):263–313.
Ashcraft AB, Duffie D. (2007). Systemic illiquidity in the federal funds market. American
Economic Review 97(2):221–225.

97

Blavarg M, Nimander P. (2002). Interbank exposures and systemic risk. Risk Measurement and
Systemic Risk-Proceedings of the Third Joint Central Bank Research Conference (Basel,
Bank for International Settlements), 287–305 Citeseer.
Bookstaber R. (2017). The End of Theory. 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Carpenter S, Demiralp S, Ihrig J, Klee E. (2015). Analyzing federal reserve asset purchases:
From whom does the fed buy? Journal of Banking & Finance 52:230–244.
Chalermchatvichien P, Jumreornvong S, Jiraporn P, Singh M. (2014). The effect of bank
ownership concentration on capital adequacy, liquidity, and capital stability. Journal of
Financial Services Research 45(2):219–240.
Bookstaber, R. (2019). The end of theory: Financial crises, the failure of economics, and the
sweep of human interaction. Princeton University Press.
Elliott E, Kiel LD (2002). Exploring cooperation and competition using agent-based modeling.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99(suppl 3):7193–7194.
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., & Summer, M. (2005). Using market information for banking system
risk assessment. Available at SSRN 787929.
Farmer JD, Foley D (2009) The economy needs agent-based modelling. Nature 460:685–686.
Furfine CH. (2003). Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion. Journal of money,
credit and banking 111–128.
Georg, C. P. (2011). Basel III and systemic risk regulation-what way forward? (No. 17).
Working papers on global financial markets.
Hakrama I, Frash¨eri N. (2018). Agent-based modeling and simulation of an artificial economy
with repast. International Journal on Information Technologies & Security 4(2).

98

Haldane AG, May RM. (2011). Systemic risk in banking ecosystems. Nature 469(7330):351.
Hu D, Zhao JL, Hua Z, Wong MC. (2012). Network-based modeling and analysis of systemic
risk in banking systems. MIS Quarterly 1269–1291.
Huang WQ, Zhuang XT, Yao S, Uryasev S. (2016). A financial network perspective of financial
institutions systemic risk contributions. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications 456:183–196.
Jacobs LR, King DS. (2016). Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford University Press).
Krichene H, El-Aroui MA. (2018). Agent-based simulation and microstructure modeling of
immature stock markets. Computational Economics 51(3):493–511.
Liu A, Paddrik M, Yang SY, Zhang X. (2017). Interbank contagion: An agent-based model
approach to endogenously formed networks. Journal of Banking & Finance.
MacLeod M, Nersessian NJ. (2013). Building simulations from the ground up: Modeling and
theory in systems biology. Philosophy of Science 80(4):533–556.
Markose, S., Giansante, S., & Shaghaghi, A. R. (2012). ‘Too interconnected to fail’financial
network of US CDS market: Topological fragility and systemic risk. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(3), 627-646.
Nier E, Yang J, Yorulmazer T, Alentorn A. (2008). Network models and financial stability.
Nyman R, Kapadia S, Tuckett D, Gregory D, Ormerod P, Smith R. (2018). News and narratives
in financial systems: exploiting big data for systemic risk assessment.
Pozsar Z. (2014). Shadow banking: The money view.
Upper C. (2011). Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets.
Journal of Financial Stability 7(3):111–125.

99

Wells SJ. (2004) Financial interlinkages in the united kingdom’s interbank market and the risk of
contagion.
DasGupta, B., & Kaligounder, L. (2014). On global stability of financial networks. Journal of
Complex Networks, 2(3), 313-354.
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2015). Systemic risk and stability in financial
networks. American Economic Review, 105(2), 564-608.
Nier, E., Yang, J., Yorulmazer, T., & Alentorn, A. (2007). Network models and financial
stability. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31(6), 2033-2060.
Battiston, S., Puliga, M., Kaushik, R., Tasca, P., & Caldarelli, G. (2012). Debtrank: Too central
to fail? financial networks, the fed and systemic risk. Scientific reports, 2, 541.
Haldane, A. G. (2013). Rethinking the financial network. In Fragile stabilität–stabile
fragilität (pp. 243-278). Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Glasserman, P., & Young, H. P. (2015). How likely is contagion in financial networks? Journal
of Banking & Finance, 50, 383-399.
Langmuir, A. D. (1980). Changing concepts of airborne infection of acute contagious diseases: a
reconsideration of classic epidemiologic theories. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 353(1), 35-44.
Jacquez, J. A., Simon, C. P., & Koopman, J. S. (1991). The reproduction number in deterministic
models of contagious diseases. Comment. Theor. Biol, 2.
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (2000). On crises, contagion, and confusion. Journal of
international Economics, 51(1), 145-168.
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1993). Emotional contagion. Current directions in
psychological science, 2(3), 96-100.

100

Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of political economy, 108(1), 1-33.
Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural
equivalence. American journal of Sociology, 92(6), 1287-1335.
John Carney, “America Lost 10.2 Trillion in 2008”, Business Insider, last accessed on 6/8/2016
DataBlog, “Failed Banks in the US: Mapping the crisis” The Guardian, last accessed on 6/8/16
Yalman Onaran. “Too Big to Fail: To Block Bailouts, Living Wills and Capital Buffers”,
Bloomberg, last accessed on 6/8/2016
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of
political economy, 91(3), 401-419.
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (2000). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 24(1), 14-23.
Sachs, J., Tornell, A., & Velasco, A. (1996). The Mexican peso crisis: Sudden death or death
foretold? Journal of international economics, 41(3-4), 265-283.
Wade, R., & Veneroso, F. (1998). The Asian crisis: the high debt model versus the Wall StreetTreasury-IMF complex. New Left Review, 3-24.
Damodaran, A. (1996). Corporate finance. Wiley.
Hong, H., Huang, J. Z., & Wu, D. (2014). The information content of Basel III liquidity risk
measures. Journal of Financial Stability, 15, 91-111.

101

